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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MANHASSET EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT 
PERSONNEL ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, AFT, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U- 26091 
- and -
MANHASSET UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
\ CONRAD W. LOWER, Labor Relations Specialist, for Charging Party 
SEYFARTH SHAW LLP (PETER A. WALKER and LORI M. MEYERS of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Manhasset Union Free 
School District (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an 
improper practice charge filed by the Manhasset Educational Support Personnel 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (Association) finding that the District violated §209-
a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
subcontracted its bus transportation services to private contractors.1 
1
 39 PERB1J4610(2006). 
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EXCEPTIONS 
The District filed 59 exceptions to the ALJ's decision which contend in substance 
that the ALJ erred in: a) failing to dismiss the improper practice charge based on the 
alleged failure of the Association to serve a timely notice of claim; b) crediting the 
Association's witnesses while discrediting the District's witnesses and in analyzing the 
documentary evidence; c) finding that substitute bus drivers were in the bargaining unit 
and that the work performed by those drivers was consistent with the Association's 
claim of exclusivity of the at-issue work; and d) concluding that the bus transportation of 
District students from home to public school, to athletic and field events and summer 
school and in providing maintenance and repair services in the bus garage constituted 
exclusive bargaining unit work. 
The Association supports the ALJ's decision. 
BOARD INVITATION FOR FILING AMICUS BRIEFS 
Following the filing of the District's exceptions and the Association's response, 
the Board issued a notice inviting interested entities to submit amici briefs relating to two 
specific issues: 
What should be the appropriate standards for establishing a 
discernible boundary or boundaries regarding bargaining unit 
work in a school district's provision of student transportation 
services? 
What public policy considerations under the Act should be 
considered by the Board in determining whether a discernible 
boundary or boundaries has been established in providing 
such services? 
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In response to the Board's request, five amici filed separate briefs. Thereafter, 
the District and Association each submitted supplemental briefs responding to the 
arguments raised in the amicus briefs.2 
Following a review of the record and after consideration of the arguments by the 
District, Association and amici, we hereby deny the District's exceptions and affirm the 
ALL 
FACTS 
Composition of the Bargaining Unit 
On March 31, 1983, the Board certified the Association as the exclusive 
bargaining representative for the following bargaining unit: 
All regular full-time and regular part-time employees 
in the following titles: audio-visual technicians, cleaners, 
custodians, drivers, groundskeepers, federal/state 
funded program assistants, community aides 
(guidance), and secretarial employees.3 
Following certification, the District and Association entered into at least two 
collectively negotiated agreements containing clauses recognizing a broader bargaining 
unit of District employees than originally certified by the Board: the July 1, 1997-June 
30, 2000 agreement and the July 1, 2000-June 30, 2005 agreement.4 
The recognition clauses in both agreements state: 
The District hereby recognizes the Association as the 
exclusive negotiating agent for employees in a unit 
consisting of nurses, audio visual technicians, computer 
2
 Consistent with the Board's notice, the identity of entities that filed briefs has remained 
o i I U I iy 11 I U U O . 
3
 Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 16 PERB jf3000.21 (1983). 
4
 During the hearing, neither the District nor Association presented evidence about the 
negotiations resulting in the voluntary modification of the Board's 1983 certification. 
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technicians, security guards, cleaners, custodians, drivers, 
groundskeepers, teacher assistants, supervisory aides and 
secretarial/clerical employees and excluding head 
custodians, assistant head custodians (evening cleaning 
supervisors), bus dispatchers, supervisor of buildings and 
grounds, administrative assistant, bookkeeper, secretary to 
the Superintendent of Schools, secretary to the Assistant 
Superintendent of Schools, secretary to the Personnel 
Director, payroll clerk, business office clerks, the central 
office receptionist/secretary, the supervisor and assistant 
supervisor for transportation and all other employees. 
In contrast to the Board's certification, the agreements contain explicit definitions 
for the term "employee" in the recognized unit. An "employee" is defined as a person 
who is employed full-time or part-time for forty-five days in a job title within the 
recognition clause. A "full-time employee" is defined as an employee who provides 
services to the District in the normal workday, workweek and work year set forth in 
schedules that are included in the agreements. A "part-time employee" is defined as an 
employee "who provides service to the District for 20 hours or fewer per workweek." 
Unlike full-time employees, part-time employees are not eligible for many negotiated 
benefits including vacation leave, sick leave and District-paid health insurance. 
Until July 1, 2005, the District employed in its transportation department 
approximately 38 bus drivers to drive 28 full size buses and 12 full size vans. 
Additionally, the transportation department employed mechanics, aides/attendants, 
clerical staff and a dispatcher. 
Substitute Bus Drivers 
In 1997, following receipt of recommendations about its transportation program, 
the District created a small pool of substitute bus drivers. The substitute drivers, who 
are alternately referred to as "permanent substitute" or "per diem" drivers, are subject to 
formal appointment by the District. On an annual basis, they are asked by the District 
Case No. U-26091 -5-
whether they wish to continue as a substitute and those who do are retained. Substitute 
drivers are assigned the same duties as all other District bus drivers. The salaries for 
substitute drivers are based on the negotiated salary scale for all drivers. Substitute 
driver vacancies are posted in accordance with the negotiated posting requirements. 
Unlike other drivers employed by the District, substitute drivers do not have fixed 
work_scbadules_Like_o.ther„drjvers,„howey„er, substitute^ 
and none have ever been sent home due to a lack of work. On at least one occasion, 
the District terminated a substitute driver for failing to come to work and for refusing to 
drive a particular bus run. Following establishment of the substitute driver's pool in 
1997, the parties did not engage in any specific negotiations over the terms and 
conditions of employment for the substitute drivers. 
Between 1982 and June 30, 2005, Ira Chudd (Chudd) was the District's 
Supervisor of Pupil Transportation. Chudd was responsible for supervising the entire 
transportation department including interviewing and hiring bus drivers, scheduling work 
assignments, preparing the District's bus routes and runs and arranging for contracting 
with outside vendors. 
Chudd testified that he did not draw a distinction between substitute drivers and 
other drivers employed by the District and treated them equally under District policies. If 
the work performance of a substitute driver was satisfactory, the driver would be eligible 
for a vacant regular position. In response to a workplace complaint from substitute 
drivers, Chudd referred them to an Association representative. 
Overtime for District drivers is offered on a rotating basis from a District-wide 
seniority list. The seniority list is comprised of all District drivers, including substitute 
drivers, in the order of their respective dates of hire. Under the negotiated agreement, 
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full-time drivers are first offered overtime in seniority order. Part-time drivers are then 
offered the overtime opportunity in the same manner. 
With the possible exception of one substitute driver, the Association did not 
receive membership dues or agency shop fees from substitute drivers. However, 
substitute drivers were informed by the Association of their obligation to pay dues or 
agencyJees-and„substitutejdrivers-attended„Asaociation_meetings^ 
On October 21, 2004, an overtime grievance was filed challenging an 
assignment to a substitute driver over more senior full-time drivers. The grievance was 
withdrawn in 2005 after it was presented at the first stage of the grievance procedure. 
Transportation Services Provided By the District 
The District provides transportation services to and from school for students 
attending the District's four public schools, as well as students attending parochial 
schools, private schools and special education. In the 2004-05 school year,5 the District 
transported 2,156 public school students, 110 private school students, 413 parochial 
students and 55 special education students. The District provides transportation 
services to and from school through daily bus routes with most routes having both 
morning and afternoon runs. The District also provides bus transportation for public 
school athletic events, field trips, band practice and summer school. In addition, the 
District operates a bus garage where District vehicles are serviced and fueled. 
Transportation To and From School 
Chudd testified that historically the District utilized private contractors sparingly 
and only based on a special District need. Association witnesses confirmed that, with a 
few minor exceptions, students attending the District's public schools are transported to 
5
 All additional references to years in this decision refer to a school year. 
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and from school exclusively by District drivers. In contrast, both District drivers and 
private contractors are assigned to transport parochial, private and special education 
students. 
On an annual basis, Chudd established, subject to review by the Superintendent 
of Schools, distinct bus routes, runs and stops for daily student transportation for all 
public,-par-Ochial,_private„and^sp.eciaLeducation„students_inJhe_„District.l 
In 2000-01, the District utilized 37 bus routes with a total of 71 bus runs for 
student bus transportation to and from school. District drivers provided transportation 
services for all the runs with the exception of seven that were performed by a private 
contractor. The private contractor was assigned runs for the transportation of parochial, 
private, and special education students. In addition, the private contractor was assigned 
to transport 120 public school students. The public school student assignment was 
temporary, in response to District safety concerns relating to the major repair of a 
railroad bridge. 
After the private contractor declined to renew its contract for 2001-02, the District 
contracted with another company to provide bus transportation. In 2001-02, the District 
established 35 bus routes with a total of 66 runs. At the beginning of the school year, 
private contractors were assigned to five runs transporting parochial, private and special 
education students and 100 public school students. In November 2001, following a 
meeting with public school parents over their complaints about the quality of 
transportation services provided by the private contractor, Assistant Superintendent for 
Business Joseph Marchesello (Marchesello) directed Chudd to "switch things around" 
6
 The record includes the District's documentation with respect to routes and runs for 
each school year from 2000-01 through 2004-05. 
Case No. U-26091 -8-
so that District personnel would transport all public school students each day. According 
to Chudd, Marchesello directed that "(i)n the future, district owned buses were to be 
used for students who attended district schools." 
In response to this directive, Chudd discontinued utilizing the private contractor to 
transport the public school students and reassigned those responsibilities to a District 
driver. In addition, Chudd announced the directive to District drivers at a meeting held in 
the transportation department's bus garage. 
District statistics establish that in the years following Marchesello's directive, 
there was a decline in the number of public school students transported by private 
contractors. In 2002-03, the District established 36 bus routes with a total of 68 runs. In 
2003-04, the District initially utilized 35 bus routes containing 66 runs which were later 
modified to 36 routes with 68 runs. In 2004-05, the District continued to utilize 36 routes 
made up of 68 runs. In 2002-03, 2003-04 and 2004-05, private contractors were 
assigned to the same runs each year to transport parochial, private, and special 
education students. According to District statistics, private contractors also transported 
a total of 10 public school students in each of those school years. 
Beginning in 2002-03 and continuing for the next two school years, one of the 
afternoon bus runs assigned to a private contractor van transported District elementary 
school students home. The District's use of the private van was in response to particular 
safety concerns associated with having a full-size District bus stop on a heavily traveled 
street. In addition, Chudd testified that the District used the private van for that run 
because the van would have been otherwise idle. 
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In 2002-03 and 2003-04, Chudd assigned one feeder run to a private contractor 
to transport District students for band practice at two elementary schools.7 Chudd 
testified that the private contractor was used because of the unavailability of a District 
bus to travel to the particular outlying area where the students resided. In the 2004-05 
school year, a private contractor was also assigned to transport two homeless students. 
On October 26, 2004, the District held a public meeting on the question of 
subcontracting the District's transportation services. At the meeting, the District 
distributed to the public a document entitled "Transportation Outsourcing: Is It a Viable 
Option for Manhasset." The document set forth District statistics outlining the number of 
public school students, private school students, parochial school students and special 
education students who are transported by the District. The document informed the 
public that all 2,166 public school students are transported by District buses.8 The 
document also stated that both District drivers and private contractors are assigned to 
transport parochial school and private school students with District drivers assigned to 
transport three-quarters of the 525 parochial and private students. At the same time, 
private contractors transport all 55 special education students. 
7
 Some runs are referred to as feeder runs in which private or parochial students are 
delivered to an assigned location where they meet another bus to transport them to 
o i i u u i u i I I O I I I O . 
8
 A few months later, during collective negotiations between the District and the 
Association oyer the decision to outsource, the District modified its statistics to indicate 
that private contractors transported 10 public school students in 2002-03, 2003-04 and 
2004-05. 
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Transportation to Athletic Events, Field Trips and Summer School 
The District provides bus transportation to public school students for summer 
school. District drivers are assigned exclusively to provide summer school 
transportation. 
With certain limited exceptions, transportation for athletic events and field trips is 
performed _e,xcjusjy_ejy_by District drivers. District drivers transport students exclusively 
except for a few trips during peak hours during the day. For 2004-05, District drivers 
were assigned 969 of the 984 field and athletic trips, with a private contractor being 
assigned approximately 15. In 2003-04, District drivers drove over 1,300 field and 
athletic trips while a private contractor was assigned to less than five. 
District Operated Bus Garage 
The District operates a bus garage adjacent to the high school where bargaining 
unit employees perform all mechanical work and repairs on buses and other District 
vehicles and fuel vehicles from a tank next to the garage. Prior to July 1, 2005, the 
District employed three mechanics, one of whom was also assigned to drive bus runs. 
With the exception of work covered by manufacturers' warranties, the maintenance and 
repair work is performed exclusively by bargaining unit members. 
Collective Negotiations on the Decision to Subcontract Transportation Services 
On January 21, 2005, the District and Association commenced collective 
negotiations with respect to the District's consideration of subcontracting the entire 
transportation program to private contractors. Between January 21, 2005 and April 20, 
2005, the Association and District participated in at least twelve negotiation sessions on 
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the subject of subcontracting the transportation services and continued those 
discussions on May 9, June 14 and June 21, 2005.9 
District's Solicitation and Acceptance of Bids 
In 1999, the District solicited bids for the possible outsourcing of the District's 
pupil transportation program. After evaluating the bids and upon the recommendation of 
the-then-AssistantSuperintendent_for_B.usiness,_the„District„decided_to_cQntinue 
operating its own transportation program but to periodically solicit bids to test the private 
sector market. 
During the course of the 2005 negotiations, the District took various steps related 
to subcontracting the transportation program, including again soliciting bids for pupil 
transportation effective July 1, 2005. 
The bids were opened on March 23, 2005 and the District adopted a resolution 
awarding contracts to various private contractors on April 20, 2005. The District's 
resolution to subcontract the transportation program was approved by the public on May 
17, 2005 and the District's decision was implemented on July 1, 2005. 
Notice of Claim 
On June 23, 2005, the Association filed with the District a notice of claim, 
pursuant to Education Law §3813(1), alleging that the District violated §209-a.1(d) of 
the Act based on its unilateral action to subcontract the transportation and maintenance 
work performed by bargaining unit members. 
9
 Our factual conclusions are based on admissions contained in the pleadings. 
ALJ Exhibit No.1, Details of Charge, 1ffl15, 28; ALJ Exhibit No. 2, ffl]1, 8. 
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DISCUSSION 
A. Notice of Claim 
A(1). Timeliness of the Association's Notice of Claim 
Prior to reaching the District's exceptions targeted at the substantive aspects of 
the ALJ's decision, we first examine the District's exception challenging the ALJ's 
conclusion Jhatihe-Association:s^notice„o£claim„wasJimely.^Ihe_.ALJ„foundJhat_the 
Association was in substantial compliance with Education Law §3813(1) when it served 
a notice of claim within 90 days of April 20, 2005, the date when negotiations ended and 
the District adopted a resolution awarding contracts to various bidders to perform the 
work. 
The District argues that the notice of claim was untimely because the 
Association's claim allegedly accrued on February 17, 2005, when the District "made a 
final decision" to subcontract by commencing the bid solicitation process. 
In support of its argument, the District cites to Board of Education ofilnion-
Endicott Union Free School District v New York State Public Employment Relations 
Board (hereinafter, Union-Endicott)™ and refers the Board to an exhibit the ALJ 
excluded from the record after sustaining a District objection to its admissibility.11 
In Union-Endicott, the Appellate Division, Third Department, concluded that an 
employee organization's subcontracting claim under the Act accrued when the employer 
resolved to place the bargaining unit work out to bid because that was the point when 
the damage to the unit "was readily ascertainable." The Third Department articulated 
the test in the following manner: 
10
 29 PERB 1J3056 (1996) revd, 250AD2d 82, 31 PERB 1J7016 (3d Dept 1998), Iv 
denied, 93 NY2d 805, 32 PERB *f|7006 (1999). 
11
 Charging Party Exhibit No. 4 for identification. 
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The key to ascertaining a claim's accrual date is to look at 
the crux of the challenge being asserted (see, Matter of 
Villella v Department of Transp, 142 AD2d 46, 48-49, Iv 
denied, 74 NY2d 602). In this case, the union has no quarrel 
with the over-all bidding process, the actual awarding of the 
bid or the terms of the contract ultimately entered into. It 
cares not what contractor is doing the work or on what 
terms; rather, its complaint is that the work is not being done 
by School District employees represented by the union. Thus 
viewed, it becomes apparent that the key event was 
petitioner,S-decisionJo-put_the_workoutJ:o_bid ._Atthatpoint 
(to the extent that it ever could be), the damage to the union 
employees was readily ascertainable.12 
The facts in Union-Endicott did not involve, as here, the solicitation of bids to test 
the private sector market. Neither were the parties in Union-Endicott engaged in good 
faith negotiations over the decision to subcontract both before and after the 
commencement of the bid solicitation process. In Deposit Central School District v New 
York State Public Employment Relations Board13 (hereinafter, Deposit), the Appellate 
Division, Third Department, had held that an impasse in collective negotiations 
constituted the triggering event for a notice of claim under Education Law §3813(1). 
Although the Appellate Division, Third Department, in Union-Endicott, cited to Deposit, it 
did not reverse that earlier decision. 
In the present case, the Association's claim under §209-a.1(d) of the Act did not 
accrue from the commencement of the bid solicitation process on February 17, 2005 
based on the conduct of the District. In 1999, the District solicited bids but decided 
against subcontracting after comparing the bids with the work performed by the drivers 
in the bargaining unit. At the time, the District decided to "check the market every four or 
12
 Board ofEduc of Union-Endicott Union Free Sch Dist v PERB, supra, note 10 at 85 
and at 7027. 
13
 27 PERB P020 (1994), affd, 214 AD2d 288, 28 PERB H7013 (1995), Iv denied, 88 
NY2d 866, 29 PERB 1T7007 (1996). 
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five years" in order to determine whether it should modify the means of delivering 
student transportation services. 
In addition, consistent with Deposit, we conclude the Association's improper 
practice claim under the Act would have been premature until after the good faith 
negotiations reached an impasse on April 20, 2005, or after the District issued a 
-resolution-that-day_aw.arclingJhe-bidsJ^ 
bids, the parties engaged in good faith negotiations on the decision to subcontract. The 
parties held four negotiation sessions prior to soliciting bids and eight bargaining 
sessions thereafter, until April 20, 2005. Additionally, the parties continued their 
discussions in three subsequent meetings ending on June 21, 2005. 
The District concedes in its exceptions that under the Act it was legally obligated 
to maintain the status quo until an impasse was reached in the negotiations.15 Indeed, it 
is well-settled that an employer may not unilaterally change a term and condition of 
employment unless it has negotiated the change in good faith to the point of impasse, 
has an urgent need to do so, and continues to negotiate thereafter to an agreement.16 
14
 As noted, the District, in its exceptions, cites to an exhibit not in evidence to support 
its argument that it commenced the solicitation of bids on February 17, 2005. During the 
hearing, the District did not offer any documentary evidence regarding the solicitation of 
bids or the conditions set forth in the solicitation. Nevertheless, as the Association 
correctly notes in its brief, the admissions in the pleadings constitute a sufficient 
evidentiary basis for the Board to conclude that the solicitation of bids commenced on 
February 17, 2005. 
15
 Exception No. 56. 
16
 Sackets Harbor Cent Sch Dist, 13.PERB._H3.Q58 (1980); Town of West Seneca, 19 
PERB H3028 (1986); Wappingers Cent Sch Dist, 19 PERB P037 (1986). See also, 
Wappingers Cent Sch Dist, 5 PERB 1J3074 (1972). 
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In Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free School District?7 the Board succinctly 
described some of the substantive negotiation areas with respect to the possible 
subcontracting of unit work, stating; 
We are aware that the District's decision was motivated by a 
need or a desire to save money. It is, however, precisely 
because its decision turned upon the labor costs involved 
that the transfer of work is amenable to resolution in the 
collective_bargaining_prjocess.^he„bargaining-process 
affords the parties an opportunity, for example, to obtain 
general or specific salary and benefit compromises which 
might have eliminated the District's felt need to transfer the 
work outside the unit. Moreover, there may well be 
alternatives to a work transfer which were within the District's 
unilateral control.18 (citations omitted) 
In the present case, the record supports the conclusion that both parties 
participated in the negotiations with a sincere desire to reach an agreement with respect 
to the District's subcontracting of the transportation services.19 In fact, many of the same 
documents admitted into evidence during the hearing were originally exchanged during 
the negotiations. 
We conclude that the District's violation of §209-a.1(d) was not ascertainable by 
the Association until the District made a final decision to subcontract on April 20, 2005 
after the parties had reached an impasse in negotiations. Therefore, we deny the 
District's exception challenging the timeliness of the Association's notice of claim 
because it was served within ninety days following the conclusion of negotiations on 
April 20, 2005. 
17
 28 PERB H3039 (1995), confirmed sub nom. 232 AD2d 560, 29 PERB1J7019 (2d 
Dept 1996). 
18
 Id. at 3090-3091. 
19
 See, Southhampton PBA, 2 PERB fl3011 (1969); Cent SchDistNo6,6 PERB P018 
(1973). 
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A(2). The Lack of Necessity of a Notice of Claim 
In the alternative, we deny the District's exception because a notice of claim 
under Education Law §3813(1) is not a precondition to the filing of an improper practice 
charge under the Act. In reaching our conclusion, we recognize that the Appellate 
Division, Third Department, has held that the service of a timely notice of claim pursuant 
t0-Education„Law„_§38J 3Xl)_constitutes„a condition^prec^^ 
practice charge against a school district under the Act.20 However, the subsequent 
decision by the Court of Appeals in Freudenthal v Nassau County1'1 (hereinafter, 
Freudenthal) calls into question the validity of the Third Department's holding. In 
Freudenthal, the Court ruled that a party making a claim through an administrative 
agency - there, the New York State Division for Human Rights - rather than in court, 
was not obligated to file a notice of claim. In addition, the Appellate Division, Fourth 
Department, in City of Syracuse v New York State Public Employment Relations 
Board,22 disagreed with the Third Department with respect to the necessity of statutory 
notices of claim as a prerequisite to the filing of an improper practice charge. The 
Fourth Department concluded that an improper practice charge is a creature of PERB's 
administrative process and, therefore, does not constitute a proceeding or action 
requiring a notice of claim. 
20
 See, Bd ofEduc of Union-Endicott Cent Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 
197 AD2d 276, 27 PERB 1J7005 (1994), Iv denied, 84 NY2d 803, 27 PERB 1J7013 
(1994); Deposit Cent Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, supra, note 13; 
Odessa-Montour Cent Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 228 AD2d 892, 29 
PERB t|7009 (1996); Bd ofEduc of Union-Endicott Cent Sch Dist v New York State Pub 
Empl Rel Bd, supra, note 10. 
21
 99 NY2d 285 (2003). 
22
 279 AD2d 98, 33 PERB 1J7022 (4th Dept 2000), Iv den, 96 NY2d 717, 34 PERB 1J7025 
(2001). 
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Previously, the Court of Appeals ruled in Cayuga-Onondaga Counties BOCES v 
Sweeney (hereinafter, Sweeney),23 that a notice of claim requirement is inapplicable to 
an administrative procedure that seeks to vindicate a public interest. In that case, the 
Court held that an Education Law §3813(1) notice of claim was unnecessary prior to 
invoking the administrative procedures under Labor Law §220. 
The Court's discussion in Sweeney with respect to the public interest underlying 
Labor Law §220 is equally applicable to the Taylor Law and PERB's improper practice 
jurisdiction. A 1969 amendment to the Taylor Law24 created, and granted PERB 
exclusive jurisdiction over, employer and employee organization improper practices, 
and delegated to PERB the sole power to establish procedures for their prevention. 
The avoidance of public sector strikes and threats of strikes was the public interest that 
precipitated the enactment of that 1969 legislation.25 
The language of the 1969 amendment demonstrates a clear legislative mandate 
for PERB to establish a symmetrical and balanced improper practice procedure equally 
applicable to public employers and employee organizations especially with respect to 
their conduct during negotiations. The requirement of a symmetrical process is 
necessitated by one of the essential purposes of the Act: to correct the uneven 
bargaining positions between public employers and employees, so as to ameliorate the 
23
 89 NY2d 395, 30 PERB 1J7501 (1996). 
24
 L 1969, ch24, §3. 
25
 See, Governor's Memorandum, New York State Legislative Annual (1969), p 49; 
Memorandum of Senate Rules Committee in Support of Legislation; Report of the 
Select Joint Legislative Committee on Public Employment Relations (1969), p 12; CSL 
§§209-a.1 and 209-a.2. 
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tendency of public employers to impose conditions of employment upon public 
employees unilaterally and thereby "infringe upon the public interests."26 
A rule requiring an employee organization to file a notice of claim against an 
employer but not by an employer against an employee organization, as a prerequisite to 
an improper practice charge, creates a procedural imbalance in the improper practice 
process inconsistent with the Legislature's intent.27 The 1969 amendment, which 
followed strikes by public school teachers in New York City and elsewhere in both 1967 
and 1968, contains nothing to suggest a requirement that the ameliorative improper 
practice process is to be subject to the notice of claim requirement in Education Law 
§3813(1) or that school districts should be treated differently than all other public 
employers. 
Although the procedures adopted by the Board in 196928 to prevent improper 
practices afford parties an equal forum to present their issues to the agency, rather than 
establish an administrative process of investigation followed by the issuance and 
prosecution of PERB complaints, those procedures were chosen as the best means of 
serving the public interest. 
The Legislature's choice in delegating to PERB the exclusive authority to 
establish the appropriate procedures necessary for the prevention of improper practices 
instead of dictating those procedures, underscores PERB's essential role in effectuating 
26
 Board ofEduc for the City Sch Dist of the City of Buffalo v Buffalo Teachers Fedn, 89 
NY2d 370, 377, 29 PERB fi7506 at 7511 (1996), quoting from the Taylor Committee 
Report, a copy of which can be found in Lefkowitz, Doerr, Berlin, Public Sector Labor 
and Employment Law, p 77 (3rd Ed. 2008). 
27
 City of Syracuse> v'New York State Pub ErnplRelBd, supra, note 22. 
28
 Rules of Procedure, Part 204 (Rules). 
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the public policy underlying the Act.29 Therefore, PERB "is not solely a judicial body 
appointed to adjudicate impartially controversies between employers and employees. 
[PERB] is a public agency acting in the public interest; the instrument created by the 
Legislature to assure to the people of the State protection" from "improper practices" set 
forth in the Act.30 
We take administrative notice of the history of our improper practice procedures. 
The procedures chosen by the Board in 1969 did not establish the agency as an 
administrative equivalent to a court whose sole function is to adjudicate improper 
practices impartially. In fact, pursuant to §204.2(a) of PERB's Rules, all improper 
practice charges are subject to an initial review and summary administrative dismissal if 
they fail to adequately set forth a basis for the invocation of PERB's administrative 
process.31 
The 1969 procedures were an outgrowth of the agency's experience with an 
earlier procedure adopted by the Board following the creation of the agency in 1967. 
Between 1967 and 1969, PERB's Rules established a procedure for the investigation 
and prosecution of complaints by Board agents similar to the procedures followed by 
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the New York State Employment 
Relations Board. PERB's pre-1969 procedure, however, was nullified by the Appellate 
Act, §205.5(d). In contrast, the Legislature codified the administrative procedures to 
be followed by the New York State Employment Relations Board (SERB) in private 
sector unfair labor practice charges under the New York State Labor Relations Act. Lab 
Law §706. 
3CI New York State Labor RelBdv Holland Laundry, Inc, 294NY 480, 485 (1945) 
31
 MABSTOA, 40 PERB 1J3023 (2007). 
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Division, Third Department, on the ground that it was in excess of the agency's 
jurisdiction.32 
Following the 1969 statutory amendment, the Board adopted the current 
procedure, which abandoned the prosecutorial model for the current procedures for a 
variety of public policy reasons. The Board found that the prior procedure made the 
age.ncy_v_uJ.nexabJj3joJa_^ 
for either prosecuting a charge or for refusing to prosecute a charge. Unlike the NLRB, 
PERB has responsibilities for mediation and the conciliation of negotiation disputes.33 
Therefore, its staff's role as impartial mediators could be undermined if its counsel was 
prosecuting one side or the other for engaging in an improper practice. 
In addition, the Board was concerned that the prosecutorial model could result in 
PERB being drawn into partisan political frays. It sought to avoid the prospect of media 
coverage of the agency issuing and prosecuting a prima facie meritorious charge 
against a local government shortly before an election, which might ultimately be 
dismissed following the presentation of evidence at an administrative hearing. The 
avoidance of such a scenario was particularly important at that time to help ensure 
public acceptance of the new public sector labor relations statute and agency. 
Accordingly, the Board deemed it more consistent with the policies of the Act to leave 
the filing of a charge and answer, along with the presentation of the evidence, to the 
parties, with PERB's role limited to examining the evidence in the record to determine 
whether remedial relief is warranted. 
Helsby v'Cent Sen DistNo 2 of the Town ofClaverack, 34 AD2d 361, 3 PERB 1J7004 
(3dDept1970). 
33
 Rules, Part 205. 
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The difference between the Board's pre-1969 and post-1969 procedures has no 
relevance to the application of a notice of claim requirement. Both procedures recognize 
that the administrative resolution of certain disputes between public employers and 
employee organizations under the Act vindicates the public interest rather than the 
private statutory right of a public employer or employee organization.34 The vital public 
interest vindicated through the improper practice process is not diminished in any 
manner by the Board choosing to adopt the current administrative process in 1969. The 
resolution of alleged improper practices by employers and employee organizations 
vindicates the public interest by aiding in the maintenance of harmonious and 
cooperative public sector labor relations through good faith negotiations thereby helping 
to ensure the uninterrupted delivery of governmental services. 
More recently, the Legislature recognized the fundamental distinction between 
the public interest served by PERB's administrative process to remedy the failure to 
negotiate in good faith when it enacted legislation in 199235 granting individuals a 
private cause of action against a public employer for violating certain rights protected by 
the Act. In crafting that amendment to the Labor Law, the Legislature preserved PERB's 
exclusive improper practice jurisdiction over alleged breaches of the duty to negotiate 
pursuant to §209-a.1 (d) of the Act.36 
Therefore, even if the Association's notice of claim was untimely, we would deny 
the District's exception. 
34
 See, Cayuga-Onondaga Counties BOCES v Sweeney, supra, note 23; Union Free 
Sch Dist No 6 of the Towns oflslip and Smithtown v New York State Human Rights 
Appeal Bd, 35 NY2d 371 (1974). 
35
 See, Lab Law §201-d(2)(d). 
36
 CSEA v City of Troy, 223 AD2d 825, 29 PERB lf7501 (3d Dept 1996). 
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^ B. ALJ Credibility Determinations and Analysis of the 
Documentary Record 
We deny the District's exceptions challenging the ALJ's credibility determinations 
and analysis of the documentary record. 
In general, ALJ credibility determinations are entitled to substantial deference 
and great weight unless there is objective evidence in the record compelling a 
conclusion that the credibility finding is manifestly incorrect.37 We find no basis in the 
record for overturning the ALJ's credibility findings. Similarly, upon our review of the 
record, we reject the District's challenge to the ALJ's analysis of the documentary 
evidence. 
C. Substitute Drivers In the Bargaining Unit 
We next turn to the District's exceptions challenging the ALJ's determination that 
) substitute drivers are in the bargaining unit. 
The District excepts to all three grounds relied upon by the ALJ in reaching his 
conclusion: a) substitute drivers are not casual employees and, therefore, are public 
employees under the Act; b) substitute drivers are included in the recognition clause; 
and c) the parties treated substitute drivers as unit members. 
C(1). Substitute Drivers Are Public Employees Under the Act 
Our decisions fully support the ALJ's conclusion that the District's substitute 
drivers are not casual employees pursuant to §201.7(d) of the Act.38 Moreover, they 
67
 City of Rochester, 23 PERB1J3049 (1990); Captain's Endowment Assn, 10 PERB 
1J3034 (1977). See also, Hempstead Housing Auth, 12 PERB 1J3054 (1979). 
38
 Weedsport Cent Sch Dist, 12 PERB P004 (1979); Unatego Cent Sch Dist, 15 PERB 
P097 (1982); Guilderland Cent Sch Dist, 24 PERB 1J4040 (1991). 
Case No. U-26091 -23-
N have "a regularity and continuity of employment sufficient" to demonstrate that they are 
entitled to representation under the Act.39 
The evidence establishes that the substitute drivers receive reasonable 
assurances of continuing employment from the District.40 They are subject to formal 
appointment by the District and the appointment is not subject to an expiration date. On 
an annual basis the District seeks confirmation that a substitute driver will be returning 
the following school year. They are included on the District's driver seniority list by their 
original dates of hire along with all other District drivers. Finally, substitute driver 
vacancies are posted by the District and their salaries are based on the negotiated 
salary schedule. 
C(2). Substitute Drivers Are Included in the Recognized Unit 
In Hammondsport Central School District,41 the Board held that long-term 
) 
substitute bus drivers/bus mechanics were included in the bargaining unit based on the 
terms of the recognition clause and the listing of the bargaining unit titles in the 
agreement, as well as the parties' practices toward the substitutes. Similarly, in 
decisions resolving unit clarification petitions, the Board examines the recognition 
clause and other contractual language to determine whether a position is encompassed 
in a particular bargaining unit. If it is determined that the contract language is unclear, 
Onondaga-Cortland-Madison BOCES, 23 PERB fl3014 (1990). 
Act, §201.7(d). 
29 PERB P063 (1996). 
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the practice of the parties is examined to determine the intent of the parties regarding 
the composition of the bargaining unit.42 
In the present case, we conclude that the recognition and definition clauses of 
the agreement along with the treatment of the substitute drivers demonstrate that they 
are encompassed within the bargaining unit. 
Following Jhe„BQardlsJ983„certification,Jhe^ 
the bargaining unit through negotiations and continued to list "drivers" as being within 
the bargaining unit. While expanding the unit composition, the parties did not exclude 
substitute drivers from the recognition clause. 
The earliest collectively negotiated agreement in the record was entered into in 
1997, the same year that the District created the substitute driver position. Following the 
establishment of the pool of substitutes, the parties negotiated one additional contract 
for the period July 1, 2000-June 30, 2005. Under the negotiated definitional clause, an 
"employee" is defined as a person employed full or part-time in one of the job titles set 
forth in the recognition clause for a period in excess of 45 days. The term "part-time 
employee" is defined as any employee who works for the District for 20 hours or less 
per week. The definitional clause does not exclude substitute drivers from the definition 
of a part-time employee. Furthermore, the clause does not define a part-time employee 
as an employee with a regular schedule; therefore, the lack of a fixed schedule for 
substitutes does not place them outside the contractual definition of a part-time 
employee. 
42
 Newburgh Enlarged Cent Sch Dist, 37 PERB P027 (2004); Town of Huntington, 33 
PERB f3049 (2000); Monroe-Woodbury Cent Sch Dist, 33 PERB fl3007 (2000). 
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We also reject the argument that because some substitute drivers may have 
worked more than 20 hours in a particular week, they are excluded from the definition of 
part-time employee. The precise number of hours worked by each substitute is not 
included in the record. In addition, the agreement does not exclude employees from the 
bargaining unit who may have worked more than 20 hours but who are not full-time. 
JiA/_eJind.nothing„inJhe„recordto„demonstra 
drivers from the bargaining unit who work more than 20 hours in a week but less than a 
full-time driver. Indeed, such an exclusion would be at odds with our experience in 
interpreting the Act. 
The fact that substitute drivers do not receive many contractual benefits, 
including vacation leave, sick leave and paid health insurance, does not demonstrate 
that they are excluded from the unit because other part-time employees who are in the 
unit also do not receive the full range of benefits received by full-time employees.43 On 
the contrary, Chudd acknowledged in his testimony that he treated substitute drivers 
equally with all other drivers employed and referred substitutes to the Association when 
they had workplace complaints. The substitute drivers' salary scale was set by the 
District based on the negotiated agreement. Vacancy notices for substitute positions 
were posted consistent with the agreement. Substitute drivers are listed on the 
overtime list along with all other drivers in the order of their respective dates of hire. 
Although the Association may not have vigorously sought membership dues from 
The District's reliance on the NLRB's decision in Robert Wood Johnson University 
Hospital, 328.NLRB._No 13.1 (1999) is misplaced.. The recognition clause in that case, 
along with the demonstrated facts and admissions cited in the decision, is substantially 
different from the present case. 
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substitute drivers, the drivers were notified by the Association of their obligation to pay 
dues and invited to participate in Association meetings. 
The District's exceptions premised on the Association's 2004 grievance are 
similarly unpersuasive. The withdrawn grievance cannot be reasonably construed as an 
admission against interest or as a determination on the merits.44 In fact, the grievance 
jwasj«ithdrawn„byJhe_Association„prLorto 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the substitute drivers are within the 
Association's bargaining unit.45 
D. The Subcontracting of Bargaining Unit Work 
D(1). Subcontracting Can Constitute a Mandatory Subject of Bargaining 
For over three decades, the Board has held that the subcontracting of bargaining 
unit work, for economic or other reasons, constitutes a mandatory subject of 
negotiations under the Act where there is no curtailment in the level of services.46 These 
holdings are premised on the "strong and sweeping policy" under the Act to support 
collective negotiations between public employers and employee organizations with 
respect to terms and conditions of employment.47 
44
 See, Antonopoulou v Beame, 32 NY2d 126, 6 PERB 1J7504 (1973). 
45
 We note that a colorable argument exists for the proposition that the use of substitute 
employees to perform unit work does not adversely impact exclusivity under the Act. 
See, Webster Cent Sch Dist, 19 PERB 1J4612 (1986), affd, 20 PERB 1J3064 (1987), revd 
on other grounds, Webster Cent Sch Dist v New York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 75 NY2d 
619, 23 PERB 1J7013 (1990). However, based on the ALJ's decision and the issues 
raised in the briefs submitted by the parties and amid, we need not reach the issue. 
46
 See, Somers Faculty Assn, 9 PERB P014 (1976). See also, Northport Union Free 
Sch Dist, 9 PERB fi3003 (1976); Niagara Frontier Transp Auth, 18 PERB fl3083 (1985). 
47
 Cohoes City Sch Dist v Cohoes Teachers Assn, 40 NY2d 774, 778, 9 PERB fi7529 at 
7564(1976). 
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As the Board stated in Somers Faculty Association: 
We see subcontracting as being a technique that can be 
used by management to undermine its agreement and/or its 
duty to reach agreement on other terms and conditions of 
employment. Thus, the decision to contract unit work is 
inextricably bound to the other mandatory terms and 
conditions of employment.48 
In Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority (Niagara Frontier),49 the Board 
recognized that such unilateral subcontracting can result in collective harm to the 
bargaining unit as well as individual harm to bargaining unit members. In that decision, 
the Board found that the rights of organization and representation, guaranteed by §§202 
and 203 of the Act, can be diminished when the scope of the bargaining unit is 
unilaterally reduced. The asserted merits or demerits of a decision to transfer unit work, 
including the fiscal and operational wisdom of a decision to privatize, are immaterial to 
) whether the subject matter is mandatorily negotiable.50 
Under Niagara Frontier, there are two essential questions that must be answered 
in deciding whether a unilateral transfer of work violates §209-a.1 (d) of the Act: 
[w]as the at-issue work performed by unit employees 
exclusively for a sufficient period of time to have become 
binding and was the work assigned to non-unit personnel 
substantially similar to that exclusive unit work?51 
48 Supra, note 46, at 3026. 
49
 Supra, note 46 (1985). See also, Saratoga Springs Sen Dist, 11 PERB P037 (1978), 
confirmed sub nom. Saratoga Springs Cent Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empi Rel 
Bd, 68 AD2d 202, 12 PERB ^7008 (3d Dept 1979), Iv denied, 47 NY2d 711, 12 PERB 
117012(1979). 
50 City of Niagara Falls, 31 PERB P085 (1998), 
Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist, 40 PERB 1J3012 at 3046 (2007). 
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Unless the qualifications for the positions have been changed significantly, the 
loss of unit work is sufficient for the finding of a violation. However, if there has been a 
significant change in job qualifications, a balancing test is applied, examining the 
respective interests of the public employer and the unit employees, both individually and 
collectively.52 
Q(2j ^Summary of Prior Board Precedent 
In defining unit work and determining the issue of exclusivity, the Board's 
analysis has traditionally focused on the past practice of the parties.53 
In Town of West Seneca,54 (hereinafter, West Seneca) the Board applied a past 
practice analysis in finding that an employer violated the Act when it expanded the 
extent to which nonunit employees were assigned work previously performed by the 
bargaining unit exclusively. In finding a violation in that case, the Board concluded that a 
clearly circumscribed past practice had been created regarding the assignment of unit 
work to non-unit employees and that the employer had broken the "perimeter of the past 
practice" that limited the use of nonunit employees to one department during the 
summer vacation period: 
Niagara Frontier Transp Auth, supra, note 45. See also, State of New York (DOCS), 
27 PERB H3055 (1994), confirmed sub nom. State of New York v Kinsella, 220 AD2d 
19, 29 PERB H7008(1996). 
53
 Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist, supra, note 51. See also Deer Park Union Free Sch 
Dist, 15 PERB 1J3104 (1982); Town of West Seneca, supra, note 16; Indian River Cent 
Sch Dist, 20 PERB H3047 (1987); City of Rochester, 21 PERB 3040 (1988), confd sub 
nom. City of Rochester v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 155 AD2d 1003, 22 PERB 
H7035 (4th Dept 1989); City of Rochester, 27 PERB H3031 (1994); County of 
Onondaga, 27 PERB 1f3048 (1994); State of New York (DMNA), 27 PERB 1J3027 
(1994); Town of Brookhaven, 27 PERB 1J3063 (1994); City of Schenectady, 31 PERB 
H3019 (1998); Vil of Rye Brook, 39 PERB H3028 (2006); Board ofEduc of the City Sch 
Dist of the City of New York, 40 PERB H3002 (2007). 
Supra, note 16. 
Case No. U-26091 -29-
The actions of the Town complained of in the charge broke 
the perimeter of the past practice. It was improper for the 
Town to do so unilaterally. It is irrelevant that no unit 
employees were laid off. A public employer may not assign 
tasks of unit employees to nonunit employees unless the 
tasks or the qualifications for the job have been substantially 
changed.55 (footnote omitted) 
One year later, in Indian River Central School District56 (hereinafter, Indian 
..i3Atfe4,.ihe_Bjoarjd_adQpie^ 
contours of a past practice that would permit an employee organization to retain 
exclusivity over unit work even though nonunit personnel have also performed the work 
in certain circumscribed contexts. For example, in City of Rochester,57 the Board found 
a discernible boundary based on the employer's decision that the at-issue work at a 
particular construction site needed a "police presence" along with thel 3-month past 
practice of exclusively assigning police to perform that work. 
Since then, Board decisions have articulated various criteria that may be 
considered in determining whether a discernible boundary exists: the nature and 
frequency of the work performed by unit members,58 the geographic location where the 
Supra, note 16, at 3070. 
Supra, note 53. 
Supra, note 53. 
City of Buffalo, 24 PERB 1J3043 (1991); County of Onondaga, supra, note 53; City of 
Rome, 32 PERB 1J3058 (1999), revd in part, City of Rome v New York State Pub Empl 
Rel Bd, 33 PERB 1J7002 (Sup Ct Albany County 2000), affd 283 AD2d 817, 34 PERB 
1J7020 (3d Dept 2001), appeal dismissed, 96 NY2d 936, 34 PERB 1J7027 (2001), Iv 
denied, 97 NY2d 607, 34 PERB 1J7039 (2001); NYCTA, 30 PERB 1J3004 (1997), 
confirmed sub nom. NYCTA v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 251 AD2d 583, 31 
PERB H7012 (1998), Iv denied, 92 NY2d 819, 31 PERB 1J7015 (1999); Dryden Cent Sch 
Dist, 36 PERB 1T3005 (2003). 
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work is performed,59 the employer's rationale for the practice,60 an explicit or implicit 
recognition that the at-issue work is distinct,61 and other facts that have set the claimed 
unit work apart from work performed by nonunit personnel.62 
In addition, commencing in West Seneca, Board decisions have examined past 
practices when determining the related issue of exclusivity. For example, in State of 
New York (DMNA).63 the Board held that a consistent employer practice of assigning 
nonunit personnel to work performed by unit members for a period in excess of one 
year constituted constructive knowledge to the employee organization of the practice, 
thereby breaching unit exclusivity. On the other hand, Board precedent establishes that 
a practice of limited and incidental use of nonunit personnel to perform tasks also 
performed by unit employees will not breach exclusivity otherwise maintained over the 
unit work. To determine whether the work performed by nonunit staff is only incidental, 
our cases have examined the practice to determine the extent to which the work was 
performed by nonunit employees in comparison to the work performed regularly by unit 
59
 City of Buffalo, supra, note 58; Hudson Cent Sch Dist, 24 PERB 1J3039 (1991); State 
of New York (Butler CorrFac), 34 PERB 1J3014 (2001). 
60
 Town of West Seneca, supra, note 16. 
61
 Hudson Cent Sch Dist, supra, note 59; County of Onondaga, 24 PERB 1J3014 (1991), 
confirmed sub nom. County of Onondaga v Kinsella, 187 AD 2d 1014, 25 PERB |f7015 
(4th Dept 1992;, Iv denied, 81 NY 2d 70, 26 PERB 1J7003 (1993); County of Erie, 28 
PERB 1J3053 (1995); Clinton Comm Coll, 29 PERB 1J3066 (1996); NYCTA, supra, note 
58. 
62 County of Nassau, 21 PERB 3038 (1988); NYCTA, 38 PERB H3024 (2005). 
63
 27 PERB P027 (1994). In the present case, we need not determine the applicable 
evidentiary standard and burden of proof with respect to an employee organization's 
constructive knowledge of a past practice that would constitute a breach of exclusivity. 
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employees.64 For example, in County of Onondaga,65 the Board held that a bargaining 
unit retained exclusivity even though nonunit personnel performed 881 out of 
approximately 54,000 of the at-issue tests. 
Finally, the Board has examined past practice in determining whether there is a 
reasonable relationship between a discernible boundary and the exclusive duties of the 
unit employe£S.66„ _ ._ 
Beginning with County of Westchester,67 the Board moved away from a 
discernible boundary analysis based solely on past practice with the introduction of a 
new concept analyzing the "core components" of work performed by multi-task 
positions. In that case, the Board stated that where an employee organization "has not 
acquired or lost exclusivity over the major aspects of the work at issue, exclusivity is not 
possessed as to tasks incidental to the performance of the core components of that unit 
work, even if only unit employees have performed those incidental tasks."68 Under the 
"core component" theory, work deemed by the Board to be "intrinsic" to the position is 
examined to determine whether a discernible boundary exists in cases where nonunit 
personnel have regularly performed several, if not most, of the tasks regularly 
64
 City of Schenectady, supra, note 53; County of Onondaga, supra, note 53; Village of 
Malverne, 28 PERB 1J3042 (1995); Honeoye Cent Sch Dist, 39 PERB 1J3003 (2006), 
confirmed sub nom. Sliker v New York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 42 AD3d 653, 40 PERB 
1J7006 (3d Dept 2007). 
65
 Supra, note 53. 
66
 City of Buffalo, supra, note 58; Hudson Cent Sch Dist, supra, note 59; Town of 
Brookhaven, supra, note 53; County of Erie, supra, note 61; Board ofEduc of the City 
Sch Dist of the City of New York, supra, note 53. See also, D(4) infra. 
31 PERB H3034 (1_998)t 
Id. at 3076. 
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performed by unit personnel.69 At the same time, under this theory only the unilateral 
reassignment of the core component of exclusive unit work to nonunit employees can 
constitute a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act.70 
D(3). The Positions of Amid Curiae 
In response to the Board's solicitation for amicus curiae briefs focused on the 
concept of discernible boundary, we received five amicus briefs. Each brief, along with 
the responding briefs from the Association and District, has substantially enhanced our 
deliberations in examining the Board's precedent in the context of the present case. 
One amicus urges the Board to abandon the concept of discernible boundary to 
determine unit work and exclusivity on the grounds that: a) it is inconsistent with the 
public policy underlying the Act favoring collective negotiations aimed at promoting 
harmonious and cooperative public sector labor relations; b) it allegedly destabilizes 
labor relations because it encourages employers to seek to erode bargaining unit 
exclusivity; c) it results in the diminution of organizational and representational rights; 
d) it undermines the certification of bargaining units; e) it encourages the filing of 
improper practice charges; and f) it is in conflict with contract reversion and waiver 
principles. 
In its place, this amicus suggests that the Board create a presumption premised 
on a certification and/or recognition clause that all work performed by persons in titles 
contained in a Board certification or a recognition clause constitutes exclusive 
bargaining unit work. The proposed presumption would be subject to an employer 
defense demonstrating that the employee organization voluntarily and knowingly waived 
69
 Port Jefferson Union Free Sen Dist, 35 PERB P041 (2002). 
70
 County of Rockland and Rockland County Sheriff, 37 PERB 1J3032 (2004). 
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exclusivity. In the present case, it argues that because the title of "driver" is contained 
in the certification and the recognition clause, all District pupil transportation constitutes 
exclusive bargaining unit work of the Association. To the extent that the District has 
utilized private contractors to provide transportation services, the Association retained 
the privilege to revert to the provisions of the recognition clause. 
A second amicus urges the adoption of what it describes as a "bright line" test for 
determining what constitutes a discernible boundary. Under this proposed test, the 
Board would apply the standard for an enforceable past practice reaffirmed in 
Chenango Forks Central School District (hereinafter Chenango).7^ Under the proposed 
"bright line" test, the requirement that a reasonable relationship exist between a 
discernible boundary and job duties would be eliminated. It claims that the reasonable 
relationship rule is too vague to be administered consistently. However, it urges the 
retention of the rule that an employer's incidental or infrequent use of nonunit personnel 
does not pierce a discernible boundary because such use does not meet the necessary 
standards for an enforceable past practice. With respect to the present case, it 
contends that under its proposed test the ALJ properly found a discernible boundary 
around the work that had been exclusively performed by the Association. 
Another amicus encourages the Board to apply a test limited to: a) core 
component analysis focusing on what is intrinsic to the at-issue work; and b) a 
determination whether the proposed discernible boundary is reasonably related to the 
basic job duties of unit members. In support of the test, it cites to Board of Education of 
the City School District of the City of New York 72 and other cases that have applied 
71
 Supra, note 51. 
72
 Supra, note 53. 
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those standards in determining that a discernible boundary did not exist. For purposes 
of consistency under the Act, it encourages the Board to apply the same standards in 
the application of the discernible boundary concept without regard to the at-issue work. 
A fourth amicus proposes a similar test that would limit the inquiry to an 
examination of whether nonunit personnel have performed the same work under similar 
working_conditions„as„b3rgaining„u™ 
would not be found when the duties performed by nonunit personnel are reasonably 
related to the components of the work performed by the bargaining unit. It argues that 
recognition of discernible boundaries based on subcategories of unit work results in 
unnecessary improper practice charges, confusion and undue pressure on public 
employers. In addition, it contends that the Board's standards in transfer of unit work 
cases have created practical obstacles to public employers being able to privatize 
governmental services. 
The fifth amicus does not propose a test under the Act for determining a 
discernible boundary. Instead, it contends that school districts should be granted broad 
discretion under the Act to privatize based on public policy arguments. In support of its 
argument, the amicus cites New York's statutory and regulatory procedures that must 
be followed by school districts when soliciting bids for contracts with private companies 
to provide pupil transportation services. 
In response to the amid briefs, the Association urges the Board to apply the test 
proposed by the first amicus that would grant the Association a presumption of 
exclusivity based on the terms of the recognition clause that would be subject to a 
waiver defense by the District. The District, on the other hand, argues that the Board 
should apply a test for discernible boundary similar to the tests urged by the third and 
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fourth amici that would focus the inquiry on the core component of the at-issue work and 
then compare the actual duties performed by the Association's bargaining unit with the 
duties performed by the non-unit personnel under similar working conditions. 
D(4). The Applicable Standard for Determining Discernible Boundary 
The arguments by the parties and amici in the present case do not persuade us 
to abandon Board precedent that has applied a past practice analysis as the means for 
analyzing the related issues of unit work, discernible boundary and exclusivity. 
A past practice analysis in transfer of unit work cases is consistent with the 
dynamics of the bilateral employer-employee organization relationship and the policies 
underlying the Act.73 The enforcement of past practices in this area permits flexibility in 
the provision of governmental services without undermining the bargaining position of 
the employee organization or eliminating the respective duties of the parties to bargain 
under the Act. As a practical matter, job duties are rarely codified in negotiated 
agreements and the assignment of duties is a management prerogative as long as that 
work is within the inherent duties of the employee's position.74 Enforcement of past 
practices in subcontracting cases encourages parties to seek agreement clarifying or 
memorializing practices and avoiding the filing of unnecessary improper practice 
charges challenging peripheral intrusions into global exclusivity.75 
When determining the scope of unit work and whether that work has been 
performed exclusively by the bargaining unit, we will examine whether an enforceable 
City of Rochester, supra, note 53. 
MABSTOA, supra, note 31. 
Long Beach Cent Sch Dist, 26 PERB P065 (1993). 
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past practice exists by applying the test recently restated in Chenango.76 It asks 
whether the "practice was unequivocal and was continued uninterrupted for a period of 
time under the circumstances to create a reasonable expectation among the affected 
unit employees that the [practice] would continue."77 This prima facie showing is subject 
to a defense raised by the employer demonstrating its lack of actual or constructive 
knowledge and, therefore, a lack of a bilateral acceptance of or acquiesce in the 
practice.78 As in Chenango, however, constructive knowledge exists when the past 
practice is reasonably subject to the employer's managerial and/or supervisory 
responsibilities and obligations. 
The criteria articulated in earlier Board decisions provide clear guidance for 
determining the discernible boundary, if any, of a past practice in transfer of unit work 
cases: the nature and frequency of the work performed, the geographic location where 
the work is performed, the employer's explicit or implicit rationale for the practice, and 
other facts establishing that the at-issue work has been treated as distinct from work 
performed by nonunit personnel. 
Although we agree with the second amicus that the past practice standard should 
be applied in transfer of unit work cases, we do not agree that the reasonable 
relationship requirement, wherein the Board will examine the relationship between the 
proposed discernible boundary and the duties of the unit employees, should be 
abandoned. This test is directly relevant to a determination of whether unit employees 
had a reasonable expectation that the past practice would continue. Moreover, we 
76
 Supra, note 51. 
77
 Quoting County of Nassau, 24 PERB P02? at 3058(1991}. 
78
 Supra, note 51. 
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agree with the District and the two am/c/that the reasonable relationship requirement is 
necessary to discourage non-meritorious assertions of subcategories of work as 
constituting a discernible boundary. 
A past practice analysis for determining discernible boundaries does not assure 
absolute predictability because past practice cases are inherently fact-specific. Thus, 
Board precedent in such cases may not always be dispositive.79 Nevertheless, we 
believe that the standards articulated today are more consistent with the policies of the 
Act than those proposed by the amici and the parties. 
The alternative standard urged by one amicus and the Association for the 
establishment of a rebuttable presumption of exclusivity premised on the titles in a 
certification or recognition clause is both impractical and inconsistent with the policies 
underlying the Act. Specific titles are not always set forth in a certification or recognition 
and the duties assigned to a particular title can vary from employer to employer. In 
situations where job titles are not listed in the certification or recognition clause, it would 
be difficult, if not impossible, to apply this proposed new standard. 
A certification or recognition is the necessary prerequisite under §204 of the Act 
for the duty to bargain. Although job duties performed is one factor in determining 
uniting questions under §207.1 of the Act,80 a certification or recognition commences, 
rather than eliminates, the duty to negotiate the mandatory subject of subcontracting; 
indeed, voluntary recognition is not a mandatory subject of bargaining.81 Upon 
79
 Hudson Cent Sch Dist, supra, note 59; State of New York (Butler CorrFac), supra, 
note 59. 
80
 See, State<_ot_[New'York (Division\ofParole), 40 PERB^30n {2007). 
81
 Village of Hudson Falls, 14PERB1J3021 (1981); Onondaga-Cortland-Madison 
BOCES, 25 PERB 1J3044 (1992). 
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certification or recognition, the parties must, upon demand, negotiate a wide variety of 
subjects including a clause prohibiting the use of nonunit personnel to perform current 
unit work and a management rights clause that may waive the right to future bargaining 
on the subject.82 
We do not accept the argument that a discernible boundary analysis encourages 
employers to unilaterally subcontract because employee organizations have an 
allegedly difficult time protecting exclusivity. Past practices can enhance or diminish the 
rights of members of a bargaining unit. In order to be able to negotiate with the 
employer, process grievances and provide other representation to the bargaining unit, 
an employee organization has a strong incentive to remain cognizant of the work 
performed by the bargaining unit. The lack of actual knowledge by an employee 
organization of the work performed by the bargaining unit, as well as work assigned to 
nonunit personnel, can lead to the loss of exclusivity if constructive knowledge can be 
imputed to the organization based on the circumstances.83 The necessary and relevant 
information is obtainable by the employee organization from the employer through 
reasonable information demands pursuant to §209-a.1(d) of the Act.84 
We also reject the proposed standard, urged by the District and the two amid, 
that the Board's analysis focus on the core components of the at-issue work and then 
determine whether the proposed discernible boundary is reasonably related to those 
82
 Somers Faculty Assn, supra, note 45; City of Poughkeepsie, 15 PERB 1J3045 (1982;, 
confirmed sub nom. City of Poughkeepsie v Newman, 95 AD2d 101, 16 PERB 7021 (3d 
Dept 1983), app dismissed, 60 NY2d 859, 16 PERB 1J7027 (1983), Iv denied, 62 NY2d 
602, 17 PERBH7009 (1984); County of Livingston, 26 PERB1J3074 (1993); Garden City 
Union Free Sch Dist, 27 PERB 1J3029 (1994); City of Newburgh, 30 PERB H3007 
(1997). 
83
 State o1rNew'York(DMNA),supra, note 63. 
84
 Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York, supra, note 53. 
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intrinsic duties. Adoption of this standard would constitute an unwarranted 
abandonment of the Board's past practice analysis as the essential test for determining 
whether a discernible boundary exists. Furthermore, it would constitute the adoption of 
an absolutist approach to exclusivity previously rejected in City of Rochester.85 
Fundamentally, the proposed standard would discourage negotiations and encourage 
unilateral employer actions in the area of transfer of unit work, results that are 
inconsistent with the policies of the Act. 
Furthermore, we note that the phrase "core component" is a mere derivation of 
the rule that incidental use of nonunit personnel to perform tasks is insufficient to defeat 
exclusivity. Unfortunately, use of the phrase has caused confusion; moreover, it has not 
been applied uniformly in transfer of unit work cases. To the extent that the Board's use 
of the phrase in prior cases has suggested an abandonment of the application of past 
practice analysis in transfer of unit work cases, those cases are hereby overruled.86 
D(5). Application of the Standards to the Present Case 
Based on the record in the present case, we conclude that an enforceable past 
practice exists establishing a discernible boundary around Association unit work that 
includes the transportation of public school students to and from the District's schools 
along with transportation for athletic and field events and summer school. In addition, 
the unit work includes the maintenance, repair and refueling of District buses and other 
District vehicles. 
BS
 Supra, note 53. 
86
 We find no merit to the arguments by the fifth amicus premised on New York's 
statutory and regulatory procedures for the solicitation of bids by school districts for 
contracts with private companies to provide pupil transportation services. 
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In November 2001, the District made an explicit and unequivocal decision that 
public school students would be transported only by bargaining unit bus drivers. The 
District made the decision following complaints by public school parents about the 
quality of transportation services provided by a private contractor. Assistant 
Superintendent for Business Marchesello notified Chudd of the decision in an explicit 
directive of indefinite duration. Thereafter, Chudd announced the decision to the District 
drivers at a meeting in the bus garage. 
In the four years following the policy pronouncement, there was a precipitous 
drop in the number of the District's public school students transported by private 
contractors to and from school. In 2000-01, private contractors transported 120 public 
school students and by 2004-05, private contractors drove only 10 out of the 2,156 
District's public school students. The evidence reveals that the assignment to private 
contractors to transport the ten District students was premised on safety and other 
specific needs. 
The record establishes that after 2000-01, the District also decreased the number 
of runs assigned to private contractors. The voluminous documentary evidence 
establishes that in the school years subsequent to 2000-01, the District maintained a 
consistent pattern of assigning private contractors to the same identical five runs for the 
transportation of parochial, private and special education students. During those same 
school years, bargaining unit drivers were assigned over 65 runs for the transport of all 
but a de minimis number of public school students. 
The District's expressed policy and rationale for assigning unit drivers to drive 
District students, the nature and frequency of the District's assignment of unit drivers to 
runs transporting public school students and the segregation of the five particular runs 
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to be driven by private contractors constitutes more than sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that the District treated daily public school transportation distinct from 
transporting parochial, private and special education students. 
The record demonstrates the existence of an enforceable past practice of unit 
drivers being assigned by the District to runs transporting public school students with 
exclusivity not being affected by de minimis exceptions. The enforceable past practice 
also includes the District assigning unit drivers to transport summer school students as 
well as assigning unit drivers to athletic and field trips. Finally, the evidence establishes 
that the maintenance and repair work on District vehicles is performed exclusively by 
bargaining unit members with the exception of work subject to a manufacturer's 
warranty. 
This practice began in November, 2001 and continued uninterrupted until July 1, 
2005. The practice was clear and unequivocal and was implemented under 
circumstances that created a reasonable expectation among unit employees that the 
practice would continue. Specifically, Chudd's announcement to the unit bus drivers of 
the District's new policy, along with its implementation thereafter, furnished unit 
employees with a reasonable expectation that the practice of assigning them exclusively 
to drive public school students would continue.87 
We reject the District's contention that the discernible boundary found by the ALJ 
has no reasonable relationship to the duties assigned unit employees. The derivation of 
this practice from a District policy decision renders this argument without merit. 
Moreover, the District's practical and functional need to satisfy a major constituency, 
87
 A different outcome in this case may have resulted if the record had not included 
evidence of an explicit District policy decision followed by a practice consistent with that 
policy. 
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public school parents, through transportation services subject to the District's daily 
direct supervision underscores the reasonable relationship between the discernible 
boundary and the unit work. The District's policy decision and practice was a 
reasonable reaction to the parental complaints. 
The overt nature of the District's policy and the statistics offered to the public at 
the October 2004 meeting lead us to conclude that the District had actual knowledge of 
the practice. Alternatively, we conclude that the District had constructive knowledge 
based on the Superintendent of School's annual review of the routes and runs 
developed by Chudd along with the District's supervisory responsibilities and obligations 
over pupil transportation and safety. 
In its exceptions, the District relies upon Indian River88 in contending that the ALJ 
erred in finding a discernible boundary. We disagree. The facts underlying the past 
practice in the present case are significantly different from those examined in Indian 
River. Unlike Indian River, the District in this case made a deliberate policy decision, 
following parental complaints, to draw a clear distinction between the transporting of 
public school students and the transporting of other students. In further contrast to 
Indian River, the District, following its decision, decreased the number of runs assigned 
to private contractors along with the number of public school students transported by 
private contractors. In addition, it set aside five specific runs to be assigned to private 
contractors. Therefore, the practice in the present case does not include the type of 
wholesale commingling of unit and private drivers as in Indian River. 
Further, the percentage of transportation services provided by private contractors 
in the present case is well below the 33% in Indian River. Here, in 2004-05, private 
88
 Supra, note 56. 
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contractors were assigned less than 9% of the total number of bus runs and less than 
1% of the District's public school students transported. In contrast, private contractors 
transported 75% of the District's 523 private school and parochial school students and 
all 55 special education students. 
The District argues that its legal obligation to provide certain transportation 
services for private and parochial students renders the discernible boundary found by 
the ALJ irrational.89 This obligation does not prohibit the District from establishing, as in 
the present case, a distinct means of providing transportation services to those 
students. 
Finally, we reject the District's exceptions challenging the ALJ's conclusion that 
the Association had exclusivity over the unit work. A comparison of District statistics 
with respect to the use of unit and nonunit personnel to perform the unit work 
establishes that the transportation of District students by private contractors has been 
limited and incidental. The unique circumstances that led the District to have ten public 
students transported by private contractors to and from school in the three years prior to 
July 2005 are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision and fully supported by the record. 
Similarly, we conclude that the small number of times that a private contractor was 
assigned to transport District students to and from field and athletic trips, in comparison 
to the number of such trips by unit members, renders the use of such nonunit personnel 
incidental. We reach the same conclusion with respect to the use of nonunit personnel 
to make repairs to District equipment based on a warranty. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the District's exceptions and affirm the decision 
of the ALJ. 
See, Educ Law §§2853, 3635. 
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The Board, therefore, finds that the District violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it 
unilaterally subcontracted work performed exclusively by employees in the unit 
represented by the Association. 
IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Cease and desist from unilaterally transferring to nonunit 
employees the work of employees ]n the bargaining unit 
represented by the Association consisting of the transporting of 
students from home to public school, to athletic and field events, 
and summer school, and the providing of maintenance and 
repair for District equipment; 
Make Association unit employees whole for wages and benefits 
with interest at the maximum legal rate, if any, lost as a result of 
its unilateral transfer to nonunit employees of the work of 
transporting students to and from public school, to athletic and 
field events, and summer school, and the providing of 
maintenance and repair for District equipment; 
Sign and post a notice in the form attached at all locations 
normally used for communications to employees in the 
bargaining unit. 
DATED: April 3, 2008 
Albany, New York 
'/OUWK*' 
Jerome Lef^owitz, gpairman 
Roberts. Hite'Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Manhasset Union Free School District in the unit 
represented by the Manhasset Educational Support Personnel Association, NYSUT, AFT, 
AFL-CIO, that the Manhasset Union Free School District: 
1. Refrain from unilaterally transferring to nonunit employees the work of 
employees in the bargaining unit represented by the Association consisting 
of the transporting of students from home to public school, to athletic and 
field events, and summer school, and the providing of maintenance and 
repair for District equipment; 
2. Make Association unit employees whole for wages and benefits with 
interest at the maximum legal rate, if any, lost as a result of its unilateral 
transfer to nonunit employees of the work of transporting students to and 
from public school, to athletic and field events, and summer school, and 
the providing of maintenance and repair for District equipment. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not 
be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ANTONIO JENKINS, 
Charging Party, 
_^ a n c l^ ._ . ._„ _ 
CASE NO. U-26822 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, 
AFT, AFL-CIO AND BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
NEW YORK, 
Respondents. 
ANTONIO JENKINS, pro se 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (ANTONIO M. CAVALLARO 
of counsel), for Respondent United Federation of Teachers 
ROBERT E. WATERS, ESQ. (KAREN SOIJMANDO of counsel), for 
Respondent Board of Education of the City School District of the City 
of New York 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Antonio Jenkins (Jenkins) to 
a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice 
charge alleging that the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New 
York (District) violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) and that the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT) 
violated §§209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Act. Jenkins alleges that the District retaliated 
against him for pursuing various contract grievances and that UFT breached its duty of 
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fair representation in the handling of his grievances.1 
The District and UFT filed answers to the charge, denying that they violated the 
Act and raising various affirmative defenses. 
A hearing was held before the ALJ on October 19, 2006 and January 22, 2007. 
On August 14, 2007, the ALJ issued a decision dismissing the charge. As to the 
-District,rthe ALJ -concluded that-Jenkinshad-failed-to-present sufficient-evidence 
establishing a prima facie case of unlawful motivation by the District. In the alternative, 
the ALJ concluded that Jenkins had failed to demonstrate that the District's legitimate 
non-discriminatory justifications for its conduct were pretextual. With respect to UFT, the 
ALJ concluded that Jenkins had failed to demonstrate that UFT's conduct regarding its 
handling of his grievances was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In hip exceptions, Jenkins challenges the dismissal of his charge against the 
District for allegedly violating §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act on-the grounds that the 
ALJ erred in: a) eoncluding that Jenkins failed to establish a prima facie case of unlawful 
motivation; b) concluding that Jenkins failed to rebut the District's evidence regarding 
the non-discriminatory reasons for its conduct; c) crediting the testimony of Principal 
Daryle A. Young (Young) regarding the District's motivation and crediting her testimony 
over Jenkins' testimony to resolve conflicting recollections over what transpired during 
meetings on June 2, 2006 and June 28, 2006; d) failing to find a violation of §§209-
a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act when the District did not permit UFT representation during the 
1
 In Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Jenkins), 38 
PERB1J3012 (2005), the Board denied prior exceptions filed by Jenkins 
challenging the dismissal by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation of his earlier and related improper practice charge against the 
District and the UFT. 
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June 28, 2006 meeting; e) denying him the opportunity to conduct discovery; and f) 
making various evidentiary rulings along with the general conduct of the hearing. 
In his exceptions to the ALJ's dismissal of his charge against the UFT, Jenkins 
asserts that the ALJ erred in failing to a find a violation of §§209-a.2(a) and (c) of the 
Act based on: a) UFT's alleged "forging" of his signature on a grievance; b) UFT's 
-presentation o f hisgrievance before-an-arbitratorrand-e) UFT-s-failure to granthim-a 
third step hearing regarding a subsequent grievance. 
Neither the District nor UFT filed a response to the exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the exceptions and 
application of relevant precedent, we reverse the ALJ's conclusion that Jenkins failed to 
establish a prima facie case against the District but affirm the ALJ's dismissal of the 
charge against the District and UFT. 
FACTS 
The relevant feels are fully set forth, in the ALJ's decision.2 They are repeated ; 
here only as necessary to address the exceptions. 
For over ten years, Jenkins has been a teacher at Public School (PS) 194 which 
is located in northern Manhattan. During the 2004-05 school year, Michael Brown, the 
then principal of PS 194, denied an application by Jenkins for a music cluster teaching 
position on the ground that he lacked the necessary certification from the New York 
State Education Department. 
In September 2004, Jenkins filed a grievance challenging the denial of the music 
teacher position, citing certain provisions in the collectively negotiated UFT-District 
240PERB 1J4565 (2007). 
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agreement (agreement) including §17(c).3 Shortly thereafter, a UFT representative 
redrafted, signed Jenkins' name on his behalf and processed the grievance. At the 
Step 2 grievance hearing on September 28, 2004, the UFT representative advocated on 
behalf of Jenkins, citing various provisions of the agreement including §17(c). After the 
District denied the grievance, UFT continued to process the grievance through the 
contractual-grievance-procedureto and including-arbitration 
In September 2005, Principal Young was appointed as the new principal for PS 
194. At the time, the District had designated the school as a "school in need of 
improvement" due to its prior ineffectual administration and poor student performance. 
At the commencement of the 2005-06 school year, Jenkins was assigned to 
teach a fifth grade class. On or about September 15, 2005, Jenkins filed a; grievance-
alleging that he should have been assigned to be a music teacher instead of a fifth ,$ 
grade teacher, UFT processed the grievance and advocated on his behalf at the first ... : $ 
and second steps'of-the' grievance procedure. The District denied the grievances ;the •'. '"•> 
grounds that Jenkiris had not applied for the position, lacked the necessary certification 
and the successful candidate for the position had the proper certification.4 
In a letter, dated December 6, 2005, UFT's Manhattan Borough Representative 
3
 Section 17(c) of the agreement states: 
Appointment to New Program, License or Title 
Teachers who are displaced by the establishment of a new 
program, license or title shall be given an opportunity to present 
their qualifications and if found qualified shall be given preference 
for appointment to such new program, license or title. 
4
 Although UFT advised Jenkins during the processing of his 2004 grievance that 
he was not qualified for the music teacher position due to his lack of the required 
certification, Jenkins did not take the necessary steps to obtain the certification. 
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informed Jenkins that UFT would not be processing his September 2005 grievance to 
the third step of the grievance procedure due to a lack of sufficient merit. Thereafter, 
Jenkins filed internal appeals with UFT challenging the decision not to further process 
his grievance. The internal appeals were ultimately denied by UFT based on its 
determination that the grievance lacked merit. 
On February 9T 20067UFT~represented Jenkins at the arbitrationwithTespectto" 
his September 2004 grievance. During the arbitration, the arbitrator refused to consider 
arguments made by UFT and Jenkins premised on §17(c) of the agreement. On 
February 13, 2006, the arbitrator issued an award denying the grievance. 
On March 6, April 3, and May 1, 2006, Young distributed to the entire PS 194 
faculty information about the District's Open Market Transfer System (OMTS).5 In 
addition, Young discussed OMTS at various faculty meetings during the same period, 
advising teachers that if they were dissatisfied with the school they should consider 
seeking a transfer. 
During the course of the 2005-06 school year, Jenkins was reassigned from the 
fifth grade class to duties in the school library and was also assigned to provide 
classroom coverage for absent teachers. The reassignment was precipitated by 
numerous administrative observations resulting in a determination that Jenkins had 
difficulties with classroom management of the fifth grade class and that he was not 
following the relevant curriculum. 
Toward the end of the 2005-06 school year, Jenkins was temporarily reassigned 
to cover a special education class due to an emergency. Prior to the reassignment, the 
5
 OMTS permits teachers to file on-line transfer applications for region and city 
wide vacancies. 
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District's Committee on Special Education granted Young permission to reassign 
Jenkins to the special education class even though he lacked the necessary 
certification. According to Young, she had been granted permission to implement the 
reassignment because it was temporary, at the end of the school year, and Jenkins had 
special education teaching credits. 
—- 0n-or-abouMvlay-1-7,--2OG6v Jenkins filed two-grievanees-with respect-to his 
reassignment to the special education class. The first grievance challenged the 
assignment on the ground that he lacked the necessary certification to teach special 
education, and the second challenged the District's failure to suspend a student for 
allegedly punching Jenkins in the chest. 
On June 2, 2006, Young conducted a first step meeting with Jenkins and 
his UFT representative, Michelle Hogan {hereinafter, Hogan), with respect to the 
2006 grievances. During the meeting, Jenkins argued that because he had been 
previously denied the music teacher assignments based on a lack of the 
necessary certification, he should not have been assigned to the special 
education class for the same reason. In response, Young explained that a 
properly certified music teacher had been selected over Jenkins and that if he 
wanted to teach music he should consider applying for a music teacher vacancy 
at another school through OMTS. in addition, Young informed Jenkins that the 
District had granted her specific permission to reassign him temporarily under the 
circumstances despite his lack of a special education certification. Finally, Young 
stated that while Jenkins had been assigned to the library he had not actively 
engaged the students 
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-. With respect to his second grievance, Young advised Jenkins that his 
accusation about being hit by a special education student had been the subject 
of an investigation that included interviews with the student, his mother and other 
students in the class. In addition, Young reminded Jenkins that he had failed to 
prepare the requested documentation about the incident prior to filing his 
grievance. Jenkins-was-informed by-Young that-as-a-result-of theHnvestigationra 
decision was made not to suspend the student because it was highly unusual for 
the student to engage in such behavior; however, the student's parents would be 
speaking with the student's therapist. 
It is undisputed that, during the June 2, 2006 grievance meeting, Young raised 
with Jenkins certain deficiencies she found in his classroom management and 
instruction during the 2005-06 school year. She stated that he needed to be more 
engaged with the students and advised him that if his job performance did not improve l;; 
in the next school year he faced the possibility of an unsatisfactory evaluation. She also 
reiterated that he had the right to seek a transfer through OMTS if he was dissatisfied 
with his assignments. 
Jenkins claims that during the June 2, 2006 meeting, Young engaged in a long 
tirade, threatening him with an unsatisfactory evaluation and discipline if he did not 
transfer to another school. In addition, he alleges that Young ordered him to stop filing 
grievances. Young denied making any such threats or ordering him to discontinue filing 
grievances. While testifying as a rebuttal witness for Jenkins, UFT representative Hogan 
stated that during the meeting Young did not threaten Jenkins with discipline, but, 
rather, reaffirmed his right to file grievances. Hogan also testified that the meeting was 
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conducted in a professional manner. 
On June 28, 2006, Jenkins attended a meeting with Young and other school 
administrators to discuss his annual written performance evaluation.5 During the 
meeting, Young gave Jenkins his annual evaluation which rated his performance as 
satisfactory. She discussed with him certain deficiencies in his job performance during 
theschool yearrDuringthe-meeting-Jenkins declined-YoungVrequest toprovide-aself-
evaluation of his job performance. Instead, Jenkins reiterated his desire to be a music 
teacher at the school despite his continuing lack of proper certification. Young informed 
Jenkins that the music program at the school was being eliminated for the 2006-07 
school year and reiterated that if he wanted to teach music or was dissatisfied with the 
school, he should consider a transfer through OMTS. 
Jenkins alleges that during the June 28, 2006 meeting, he was verbally abused, 
denied union representation and threatened with discipline and an unsatisfactory -* 
evaluation if he did not transfer to another school. Young denied that Jenkins was 
verbally abused or threatened in any manner during the meeting. In response to 
Jenkins' inquiry, Young informed him that a UFT representative was not present at the 
meeting because the purpose of the meeting was to review his annual evaluation. 
DISCUSSION 
It is well-established that a charging party in an improper practice charge alleging 
unlawfully motivated interference or discrimination in violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of 
the Act has the burden of proof to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that: a) 
the affected individual engaged in protected activity under the Act; b) such activity was 
6
 It is undisputed that Young met with other teachers that year who were also 
experiencing difficulties in the classroom or who were receiving an unsatisfactory 
evaluation. 
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known to the person or persons taking the employment action; and c) the employment 
action would not have been taken "but for" the protected activity.7 
Certain forms of employer conduct which, if proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence, can constitute a perse violation of §209-a.1 (a) of the Act and, therefore, do 
not require the charging party to present proof of unlawful motivation.8 Most violations of 
-§§-209-a-1-(-a-)-and-(e)rhoweverr-requ-iFe-pF00f-of-an employer's-unlawful-motivation-that 
can be proven through direct evidence such as oral statements, memoranda or email, 
or by means of circumstantial evidence.9 
Direct evidence is "evidence tending to show, without resort to inference, the 
existence of a fact in question."10 When a charging party introduces direct evidence of 
unlawful discriminatory motivation, the burden then shifts to the respondent to establish 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the protected activity under the Act was not a 
motivating factor in the employment action. 
Unlawful motivation "is rarely so obvious or its practices so overt" because it is 
7
 City of Salamanca, 18 PERB P012 (1985); Town of Independence, 23 PERB 
H3020 (1990); County of Orleans, 25 PERB H3010 (1992); Stockbridge Valley 
Cent Sch Dist, 26 PERB P007 (2000); County of Wyoming, 34 PERB j[3042 
(2001). 
8
 See, State of New York, 10 PERB 1J3108 (1977); cf. Greenburgh #11 Union 
Free Sch Dist, 33 PERB H3018 (2000). 
9
 Town of Hempstead, 19 PERB 1J3022 (1986); Town of Independence, supra, 
note 7; Vil of New Paltz, 25 PERB 1J3032 (1992); Hudson Valley Community Coll, 
25 PERB 1J3039 (1992); County of Nassau, 35 PERB H3045 (2002), confirmed 
sub nom. CSEA v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 2 AD3d 1197, 36 PERB 
1J7019(3dDept2003). 
Tyler v Bethlehem Steel Corp, 958 F2d 1176, 1183 (2d Cir 1992). 
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"accomplished usually by devious and subtle means."11 More commonly, unlawful 
motivation is demonstrated through circumstantial evidence that may include disparity of 
treatment toward the affected individual, the timing and context of the employment 
action or decision, the resurrection of disciplinary allegations, or the pretextual rationale 
given to the individual or the employee organization for the employment action or 
decision™2-! nsome-easesy circumstantial-evidence can-be more-persuasive-than-direet 
evidence in establishing unlawful motivation.13 
At minimum, the circumstantial evidence necessary to prove a prima facie case 
must be sufficient to give rise to an inference that unlawfully motivated interference or 
discrimination was a factor in the employer's conduct. This relatively low initial 
evidentiary threshold for establishing a prima facie case in circumstantial evidence 
cases is necessitated by the principles underlying §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act along 
with the lack of discovery and the pleading requirements under qur Rules of Procedure 
(Rules).14 Although the timing and the context of events alone in a circumstantial 
evidence case may not be sufficient to meet a charging party's ultimate burden of proof, 
the timing and context of an employer's conduct may be sufficient to establish an 
inference of improper motivation, thereby shifting the burden of persuasion to the 
respondent to come forward with evidence demonstrating a non-discriminatory basis for 
11
 300 Gramatan Ave Assoc v State Div of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 183 (1978). 
12
 County of Cattaraugus and Sheriff of Cattaraugus County, 24 PERB 1J3001 
(1991); Hudson Valley Community Coll, supra, note 9; County of Wyoming, 
supra, note 7; County of Orleans, supra, note 7; Catskill Regional OTB, 28 PERB 
113002(1995). 
13
 See, Desert Palace, Inc v Costa, 539 US 90, 100 (2003). 
14
 State of New York (SUNY at Oswego), 34 PERB p 0 1 7 (2001). 
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the alleged conduct.15 To the extent the Board's decision in Roswell Park Cancer 
Institute^6 suggests otherwise, it is hereby overruled. 
If a charging party establishes an inference of unlawful motivation through 
circumstantial evidence, the burden of persuasion shifts to the respondent to rebut the 
inference by presenting evidence demonstrating that the employment action or conduct 
was motivated by-a-legitimatenon-discriminatory-businessreasonJ-lf therespondent— 
establishes a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, then the burden shifts back to the 
charging party to establish that the articulated non-discriminatory reason is pretextual.18 
At all times, however, the burden of proof rests with the charging party to establish the 
requisite causation under the Act by a preponderance of evidence. 
In this case, Jenkins has clearly satisfied the first two requirements for 
establishing a violation of §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act. It is uncontroverted that 
Jenkins engaged in protected activity by filing contract grievances in September 2004p. 
September 2005 and May 2006. It is also uncontroverted that Young had knowledge of 
Jenkins' grievance activities. 
With respect to the third requirement for establishing a violation of §§209-
a.1(a) and (c) of the Act, Jenkins must establish, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the District took an improper employment action and that the 
District would not have taken such action but for Jenkins having engaged in the 
15
 Board ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York, 35 PERB1J3002 (2002). 
1634PERB T|3040(2001). 
17
 State of New York (SUNYat Buffalo), 33 PERB ^3020 (2000). 
18
 Supra, notes 7, 8, 11 and 14. 
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protected activity. 
An improper employment action under the Act can include a termination, 
demotion, involuntary transfer, reassignment, reprimand, denial of a promotion, 
or denial of pay or benefits, it can also include explicit or implied threats of 
retaliatory action for engaging in protected activity. 
Based-upon ourereading oftherecord, it wouldappear-that-Jenkins-contends-that 
the following alleged District conduct constitutes violations of §§209-a.1 (a) and (c): 1) 
abusive and threatening statements made by Young during the June 2, 2006 grievance 
meeting; 2) Young's discussion of deficiencies in Jenkins' job performance during the 
June 2, 2006 meeting; 3) Young's holding the June 28 meeting to discuss Jenkins' year-
end performance evaluation; 4} abusive and threatening statements made by Young 
during the June 28, 2006 meeting; 5) the lack of union representation during the June ;f-
) 
28, 2006 meeting; and 6) statements made by Young during the June 2 and 28 >• 
meetings regarding Jenkins'transfer opportunities. 
Jenkins testified that at the June 2, 2006 grievance meeting, Young ordered him 
to stop filing grievances, encouraged him to transfer to another school through OMTS 
and threatened him with a negative evaluation and discipline if he did not transfer. 
If Jenkins established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that during the meeting 
Young ordered him to stop filing grievances, it would constitute a perse violation of 
§209-a.1(a) of the Act. It would also constitute direct evidence of unlawful motivation 
regarding Young's other alleged conduct during the meeting. 
However, the testimony of Young and Hogan directly contradicts Jenkins' 
allegation that he was ordered to stop filing grievances and threatened with a negative 
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evaluation and discipline at the June 2, 2006 meeting. After hearing the testimony of 
Jenkins, Young and Hogan about the June 2, 2006 meeting, the ALJ concluded that 
Young did not order Jenkins to stop filing grievances and did not otherwise verbally 
abuse or explicitly threaten Jenkins. This conclusion is premised, in part, on a credibility 
determination based on the demeanor of the witnesses. The ALJ concluded that 
Young's testimony, denying that she ordered him to stop filing grievances or otherwise 
verbally abused or threatened Jenkins, is more credible than Jenkins' inconsistent and 
confused testimony. The ALJ's credibility determination is bolstered by Hogan's 
testimony. 
We find no basis in the record to disturb these ALJ credibility conclusions. 
An ALJ's credibility determination resolving a conflict in testimony based on the 
demeanor of witnesses is entitledb substantial deference and great weight 
y
 unless there is objective evidence in the record compelling a conclusion'tha1. itu i ,-•• 
credibility finding is manifestly incorrect.19 
Therefore, we conclude that Jenkins failed to establish a perse violation 
of the Act or present direct evidence of unlawful motivation with respect to 
Young's conduct during the June 2, 2006 meeting.20 
Jenkins testified that during the June 28, 2006 meeting, he was verbally abused 
and threatened with discipline and an unsatisfactory evaluation if he did not transfer to 
19
 City of Rochester, 23 PERBfl3049 (1990); Captain's Endowment Assn, 10 
PERB1J3034 (1977); see also, Hempstead Housing Auth, 12 PERB TJ3054 
(1979). 
20
 Based on our conclusion, we do not need to reexamine in the present case the 
legal question whether the presumption of unlawful motivation in a perse 
violation case is irrebuttable or rebuttable. See, State of New York, supra, note 8; 
, Greenburgh #11 Union Free SchDisi, supra, note 8. 
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another school; however, Young denied that Jenkins was verbally abused or threatened 
in any manner during the meeting. As with the testimony regarding the June 2, 2006 
meeting, the ALJ found Young's testimony to be credible and concluded that Jenkins 
was not verbally abused or explicitly threatened during the June 28, 2006 meeting. We 
again find no basis in the record to disturb the ALJ's credibility conclusions. Therefore, 
wexoncludeihatJenkins_hasIailedJo_establis^ 
that Young verbally abused or explicitly threatened him during the June 28, 2006 
meeting. 
In his exceptions, Jenkins asserts, among other things, that the ALJ erred in 
finding that he failed to present sufficient evidence relating to causation to establish a 
prima facie ease of unlawful motivation against the District. We grant Jenkins' 
exceptions, in part. 
' It is undisputed that Young made negative comments about Jenkins'job & 
performance and statements about his transfer opportunities during the grievance 
meeting and reiterated his transfer opportunities during the June 28, 2006 meeting. 
Based on the timing, content and context of these statements, we conclude they 
constitute a bare minimum of circumstantial evidence sufficient to shift the burden of 
persuasion to the District to come forward with evidence demonstrating a legitimate 
1
 non-discriminatory reason for the statements. 
The purpose of the June 2, 2006 meeting was to discuss Jenkins' May 17, 2006 
grievances, neither of which dealt with his job performance, evaluation or transfer 
opportunities. On their face, and in the context of the grievance meeting, Young's 
statements can be construed as constituting an implicit threat of retaliation for Jenkins' 
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grievance activities. Similarly, Young's conduct at the June 28, 2006 meeting, under 
the totality of the circumstances, suggests that the meeting, along with Young's 
comments relating to Jenkins' transferring, may have been unlawfully motivated in 
violation of the Act. 
Therefore, we reverse the ALJ to the. extent that she found that Jenkins did not 
present sufficientevidenceto-establish^anJnference-otunlawful-motivation-thereby -
shifting the burden of persuasion to the District to present non-discriminatory reasons 
for Young's admitted statements during the two meetings. 
We reject, however, Jenkins' exceptions challenging the ALJ's conclusion that 
the District had met its burden of persuasion refuting the inference of unlawful 
motivation established by Jenkins'testimony. 
The ALJ concluded that Young's testimony about her comments and conduct , i 
during the meetings was more credible than Jenkins' testimony. As noted, the ALJ's # 
eredibiiity resolution is entitled to substantial deference and great weight and we find ' 
nothing in the present record to disturb those findings. 
The record supports the ALJ's conclusion that Young's comments about Jenkins' 
job performance during the grievance meeting were not unlawfully motivated. In 
response to Jenkins' grievances challenging his reassignment to the special education 
class and alleging that he had been hit by a student, Young discussed the performance 
problems Jenkins had in his prior assignments that school year including problems with 
classroom management. Her comments were made in the context of explaining the 
rationale for his recent temporary reassignment that was the subject of the grievance. In 
addition, Young informed Jenkins of the steps that had been taken to investigate his 
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ailegation of being hit, reminded him that he had failed to file a written report as 
requested and stated that it was highly unusual for this particular student to engage in 
such conduct. 
The record further supports the ALJ's conclusion that Young's discussion with 
Jenkins of transfer opportunities during the grievance meeting was not unlawfully 
motivated. The comments were responsive to Jenkins continued desire fora music 
assignment rather than a special education assignment. Young had already distributed 
information about transferring to the school's entire faculty encouraging dissatisfied 
teachers to seek a transfer. -
Furthermore, Young's meeting with Jenkins about his annua! evaluation did not 
constitute disparate treatment. Young met with other teachers whose work performance ip-^j i., 
•needed improvement or who received an -unsatisfactory evaluation that school year. r '&§$&>• I 
The j'ac^hai Jenkins received a satisfactory annua! evaluation during the meeting fully .>..'.-%*•• I 
supports the conclusion that Young's comments about fee .potential' for future negative ••--.-»*.•>••;?•••! 
consequences if his job performance did not improve was advisory in nature and not 
motivated by unlawful animus. Finally, Young's comments during the meeting about 
transferring were motivated by the scheduled expiration of that transfer opportunity in 
August 2006. 
It is uncontroverted that Jenkins did not receive union representation during the 
June 28, 2006 meeting. However, contrary to his exceptions, Jenkins did not have a 
right under the Act to union representation during the June 28, 2006 meeting to discuss 
his evaluation. In New York City Transit Authority v New York State Public Employment 
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Relations Board?*1 the Court held that the Act did not grant public employees a statutory 
right to union representation even during a disciplinary interrogation. Moreover, the 
recent amendment to the Act, adding §209-a.1 (g), is not retroactive.22 Consequently, 
the District's refusal to permit union representation during the June 28, 2006 meeting, 
even if true, would not constitute a violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act. 
— -We-findJhat-the-remaining-exceptions-regardingihe-dismissal otthexharge— 
against the District to be similarly without merit. Under the Rules, parties are not entitled 
to conduct pre-hearing discovery. In addition, the record demonstrates that there is no 
basis for overturning the ALJ's evidentiary rulings or reversing the ALJ's decision based 
on the general conduct of the hearing. 
We deny Jenkins' exceptions challengingthe dismissal of the charge against 
UFT. It is well-settied that in order.to establish a duty of fair representation charge » ' * I 
against an. employee organization under the Act, a charging party must demonstrate - *-*"*• 
that the employee organization engaged in arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith " -
conduct.23 • . . . 
We agree with the ALJ's conclusion that UFT did not handle Jenkins' grievances 
in an arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith manner. The Board will not substitute its 
judgment for that of an employee organization regarding the filing and prosecution of 
grievances, since the employee organization is entitled to a wide range of reasonable 
^ 8 NY3d 226, 40 PERB 1J7001 (2007). 
22
 L 2007, ch 244. 
23
 TWU Local 100 (Brockington), 37 PERB H3002 (2004); AFSCME Council 66, 
Local 3933 (Altieri), 39 PERB 1J3015"'(2006)."""' 
) 
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discretion in this regard under the Act.24 
The fact that a UFT representative redrafted and signed Jenkins' name to the 
grievances on his behalf, before processing it, is insufficient to establish a violation of 
the Act. In fact, UFT processed that grievance and advocated on Jenkins' behalf to and 
including arbitration. Jenkins' dissatisfaction with the arbitrator's rulings and award does 
j3otxlfimonstrateJhatJJ.FX_viQlate.dJts_d.u.ty_unde.r.ihe_Act._, . 
Finally, Jenkins failed to demonstrate that the refusal of UFT to continue to 
process his second grievance regarding the music assignment was arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith. The record establishes that UFT's final decision was 
based on UFT's conclusion that the grievance's lack of merit, following UFT's 
consideration of Jenkins' internal appeals, and came after the unsuccessful arbitration 
award denying Jenkins'first grievance relating to the music assigniTient. v 
Based on the foregoing,.we grant Jenkins' exceptions to 'he.limited extehtthat he 
presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish an inference of unlawful 
animus by the District but affirm the ALJ's decision to dismiss the charge in all other 
respects. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the improper practice charge is dismissed. 
DATED: April 3, 2008 
Albany, New York 
Jerome LefKowitzMJhairman 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
; See, District Council 37, AFSCME (Gonzalez), 28 PERB fl3062 (1995). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the County of Sullivan and 
Sullivan County Sheriff (County) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on 
an improper practice charge filed by the Sullivan County Patrolman's Benevolent 
Association, Inc. (PBA), finding that the County violated §§209-a.1 (d) and (e) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). The ALJ found that the County violated 
§209-a.1(d) of the Act by unilaterally implementing a system for the recovery of leave 
accruals and holiday pay which unit employee, Deputy Sheriff Amanda Cox (Cox), 
allegedly owed to the County. Further, the ALJ found that the County violated §§209-
a.1(d) and (e) when it deducted 6.67.hours of vacation leave, 8 hours of sick leave and 
Case U-26725 - 2 -
24 hours of personal leave from Cox's leave accruals. The ALJ dismissed the alleged 
violations of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) concluding that the PBA had not established that the 
County was improperly motivated under the Act.1 Finally, the ALJ declined to defer the 
charge to the parties' contractual grievance procedure, although there was a grievance 
pending that had been filed by the PBA on behalf of Cox. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The County argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in finding that the County 
violated §§209-a.1(d) and (e) of the Act when it concluded that Cox was on General 
Municipal Law (GML) §207-c leave continuously from December 17, 2004 through 
January 24, 2005, and by, thereafter, deducting sick, vacation, and personal leave 
accruals and requesting reimbursement for holiday pay. The PBA supports the ALJ's 
decision. 
Following receipt of the County's exceptions limited to the alleged violations of 
§§209-a.1(d) and (e) of the Act, the Board requested that the parties submit 
supplemental briefs on the following question: 
Whether the Board should apply its authority to defer the 
charging party's §§209-a.1(d) and (e) claims based on the 
April 2006 grievance that is subject to the parties' contractual 
dispute resolution procedure that ends in binding arbitration? 
Thereafter, the County informed the Board that it would not be filing a 
supplemental brief, noting that the ALJ had determined that deferral was inappropriate 
1
 No exceptions were taken to this finding of the ALJ. Therefore, it is not before us. 
Rules §213.2(b) (4); Town ofOrangetown, 40 PERB tf3008 (2007). 
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and the County had not excepted to that determination. The PBA filed a supplemental 
brief, arguing that the Board should not defer the §§209-a.1(d) and (e) allegations after 
the ALJ had heard and determined them because such a deferral would be contrary to 
existing Board policy and precedent. 
Subsequently, the Board requested that the parties file supplemental pleadings, 
pursuant to §213.3 of the Rules of Procedure (Rules), setting forth the status of the Cox 
grievance. Thereafter, both parties filed affirmations stating that no action had been 
taken with respect to the grievance following the filing of the demand for arbitration and 
that an arbitrator had not been selected.2 
Based upon a review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision3 and are repeated here only as 
necessary to address the exceptions. 
The parties' collective bargaining agreement (agreement) expired on December 
31, 2000. As relevant to the exceptions before the Board, the agreement provides that 
employees are to receive pay for specific holidays.4 Employees accrue vacation time 
monthly in 6.67 hour increments if they are employed for more than one month but less 
2
 The County's affirmation further states that Cox resigned from her position in August 
2007. 
340PERB 1J4519 (2007). 
4
 Employees receive one-half day off with pay for New Year's Eve and Christmas Eve, 
and one day off with pay for New Year's Day, Martin Luther King, Jr. Day and Christmas 
Day. 
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than three years. Employees accrue sick leave at the rate of one day for each month of 
continuous service. Annually, three days of personal leave are credited to each 
employee on January 1, and one day of personal leave is credited on July 1 and 
September 1. Article XXI of the agreement sets forth the grievance procedure for the 
resolution of disputes under the agreement including, among other matters, disputes 
regarding leave accruals and use. 
Article I provides that the agreement will be interpreted consistent with County 
local laws, resolutions and regulations. County Local Law#1 of 1989, entitled the 
Sheriff's Department Disability Claims Procedure Law (DCPL), defines the rights and 
procedures for County employees under GML §207-c. The parties have incorporated 
the DCPL into the collective bargaining agreement.5 
) 
Pursuant to DCPL §601, GML §207-c eligibility decisions by the Insurance 
Administrator may be appealed to a County designated hearing officer. A claimant is 
entitled to a hearing and, following the hearing, the hearing officer presents a 
recommended report to the Insurance Administrator. The Insurance Administrator then 
has ten days to prepare a decision. Under the local law, determinations by the 
5
 Article XIX, §1902 states: 
Local Law#1 of 1989 entitled the Sheriff's Department Disability 
Claims Procedure Law, defines the rights of employees and the 
application of Section 207-c of the General Municipal Law. A 
copy of such iocai iaw is attached hereto. Aiieged violation of such 
Local Law or of this section of this agreement are not subject to the 
provisions of Article XXI of this agreement and must be 
resolved in accordance with the provisions of such local law. -
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Insurance Administrator are subject to review pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice 
Law and Rules (CPLR). 
DCPL §701 states that if an employee is found ineligible for GML §207-c "[t]he 
claimant shall be required to reimburse the County for any funds collected which are 
attributable to 207-c benefits." This section also provides that the failure to reimburse 
the County can render the claimant ineligible for GML §207-c benefits. 
Cox has been employed by the County since July 21, 2003. On December 16, 
2004, Cox slipped on ice while entering her patrol vehicle at the commencement of her 
shift. Cox suffered injuries, for which she was treated at the emergency room, and then 
returned to work. She worked the remainder of her shift that day and an extended shift 
until noon on December 17, 2004. 
Thereafter, Cox had three regularly scheduled days off: December 17, 18 and 
19, 2004. Cox was seen at her doctor's office on December 20, 2004 and was given a 
note excusing her from work until December 23, 2004. Cox worked desk duty for two 
shifts on December 23, 2004.6 Cox did not work on December 24, 2004 due to her 
injury. Cox's regularly scheduled days off were December 25 and 26, 2004 and she 
returned to work on December 28, 2004. On December 29, 2004, Cox was again seen 
by her doctor and was excused from work on December 29, 30 and 31, 2004.7 
Cox had regularly scheduled days off on January 1,2,8 and 9, 2005 and she did 
not work on January 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, 2005 due to her injury. She worked desk duty on 
6
 Cox had agreed to fill a shift for another deputy and was unable to find a replacement. 
7
 The diagnosis was "sciatic root syndrome or a lumbar radiculopathy on the left side", 
causing pain and numbness in the back and leg. 
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January 10, but was out of work due to her injury on January 11 and 12, 2005. Cox took 
January 13 and 14 off and was not scheduled to work on January 15 and 16, 2005. Cox 
worked her regular shift on January 17, but was out of work due to her injury on January 
18, 2005. She returned to work on January 19, had a regularly scheduled day off on 
January 20 and took January 21, 2005 off due to her injury. She returned to full duty on 
February 2, 2005. 
Cox applied to the County for GML §207-c leave benefits. On January 25, 2005, 
the County denied her the benefit. Cox then appealed the denial of benefits to the 
County designated hearing officer consistent with DCPL procedures. 
On January 19, 2006, the hearing officer issued a decision determining that Cox 
had been out of work on 16 specific days due to a work-related injury and was entitled 
to GML §207-c benefits for those days.8 The County stipulated at the appeal hearing 
that it would be bound by the hearing officer's recommendations. 
Thereafter, by letter dated March 17, 2006, Cox was informed by Monica 
Farquhar Brennan (Brennan), the County's Director of Risk Management and 
Insurance, that effective December 17, 2004 through January 21, 2005, Cox would be 
considered to be "out on leave under 207-c" and the 16 days outlined by the hearing 
officer would be restored to her. However, Brennan noted, that §103(g) of the DCPL, 
states: 
Section 207-c Benefits - Means benefits provided under 
§207-c of the General Municipal Law, including the full 
Relying on medical evidence showing that Cox's injury was such that on some days 
she would feel well enough to go to work and that on others she would not be able to 
work, the hearing officer found that her injury accounted for 16 specific absences from 
work. 
Case U-26725 - 7 -
amount of salary or wages and expenses for medical 
treatment or hospital care rendered as a result of job related 
injury or illness, but shall not include continued payment of 
uniform allowance, continued accrual of leave time, or other 
benefits to which active employees are entitled. 
Notwithstanding the lack of a procedure in either the parties' agreement or the 
DCPL for recoupment or reimbursement of wages or benefits, Brennan concluded that 
Cox's accruals would be adjusted down by 6.67 hours of vacation leave and 8 hours of 
sick leave for December 2004 and 24 hours of personal time for January 2005. Brennan 
also instructed Cox to make arrangements with the County's payroll department to 
reimburse the County for 32 hours of holiday pay for the following holidays: 4 hours on 
Christmas Eve, 8 hours on Christmas Day, 4 hours on New Year's Eve, 8 hours on New 
Year's Day and 8 hours on Martin Luther King, Jr. Day. Cox was not required to return 
the uniform allowance she received from the County in January 2005 or the pay for the 
days she actually worked. 
The PBA filed a grievance on April 6, 2006 in response to Brennan's March 17, 
2006 letter to Cox. After the grievance was denied at the initial steps of the grievance 
procedure, the PBA filed a demand for arbitration on June 6, 2006. 
Before the ALJ, Brennan testified that it was her belief that once the hearing 
officer determined that Cox was entitled to GML §207-c benefits, Cox was considered to 
be on GML §207-c leave for the entire period of her disability, December 17, 2004 
through January 24, 2005. Brennan reached this conclusion even though during that 
period Cox had worked several specific days and there were regularly scheduled days 
off and holidays. As a result of her belief, Brennan calculated the leave accruals and 
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holiday pay that had to be returned to the County because Cox was not in "continuous 
employment" on the days that leave accrued or that were eligible for holiday pay. 
Brennan also testified that, in her opinion, because Cox was in GML §207-c 
status at the end of December 2004, when sick and vacation leave were credited for the 
month of December, and on January 1, 2005 when personal leave was credited, she 
was not eligible for those accruals. Brennan admitted, however, that she did not 
administer the parties' collective bargaining agreement and was not familiar with its 
terms. Likewise, Brennan testified that because Cox was on GML §207-c leave during 
December 2004 and January 2005, she was not entitled to holiday pay for Christmas 
Eve, Christmas Day, New Year's Eve, New Year's Day and Martin Luther King, Jr. Day. 
Brennan's belief was based on how she handled similar situations with the County's 
correction officers, who are not in the PBA's bargaining unit, but who are eligible for 
GML §207-c benefits and who are also subject to the DCPL. 
DISCUSSION 
Deferral Issues 
In response to the County's request, the ALJ declined to defer the charge to the 
contractual grievance procedure because Cox's right to receive the at-issue benefits, 
although derived from the parties' agreement, was subject to the statutory provisions of 
the DCPL which are not subject to arbitration. In addition, the ALJ did not defer the 
charge because it also alleged violations of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act that were 
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not derivative of the §§209-a.1(d) or (e) allegations.9 The ALJ denied deferral even 
though the PBA had pending a related grievance filed on behalf of Cox.10 
As noted above, the County has not filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision on 
deferral and both the County and the PBA have each stated their opposition to the 
Board now deferring the §§209-a.1(d) and (e) allegations. 
In Town of Carmel,^ (hereafter, Carmel), the Board, on its own motion, deferred 
to the parties' contractual grievance procedure a charge alleging a unilateral change in 
violation of §§209-a.1(d) and (e) of the Act. The Board found that jurisdictional deferral 
was necessary because the record was unclear with respect to the at-issue 
agreement's duration and whether or not the grievance procedure was applicable to that 
agreement. In the alternative, the Board concluded that a merits deferral of the charge 
was appropriate because the agreement constituted an arguable source of right to the 
charging party and an arbitration award might be dispositive of the relevant issues. The 
Board reached its decision to defer even though the employee organization had not filed 
a grievance and the issue of deferral had not been raised to the ALJ or the Board. 
In the present case, we must decide whether, pursuant to Carmel, it would be 
consistent with the public policy of the Act for the Board, on its own motion, to defer the 
remaining §§209-a.1(d) and (e) allegations to the parties' grievance procedure, even 
9
 Schuyler-Chemung-Tioga BOCES, 34 PERB1J3019 (2001); Connetquot Cent Sch 
Dist, 19 PERB H3045 (1986). 
10
 The grievance alleged that the County violated the contractual leave and holiday pay 
provisions. 
11
 29 PERB P073 (1996). 
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afterthe ALJ had dismissed of the §§209-a.1(a) and (c) allegations and reached the 
merits of the §§209-a.1(d) and (e) allegations. 
In State of New York (SUNY Health Science Center of Syracuse),12 (hereafter, 
SUNY), the Board determined that a merits deferral of a §209-a.1(d) unilateral change 
allegation to arbitration was appropriate, noting that an interpretation of the parties' 
agreement was necessary because the agreement was a reasonably arguable source 
of right and a binding arbitration award was potentially dispositive of the charge. At the 
same time, the Board retained the §209-a.1(d) bad faith negotiations allegation because 
the disposition of that aspect of the charge did not rest on an interpretation of the 
agreement and it would not likely be an issue reached by the arbitrator. The Board 
made clear that it was not holding that a bifurcated merits deferral policy, applied 
allegation by allegation, would be appropriate in every case. Rather, the Board stated 
that: 
We... need not decide here whether a deferral of unilateral 
change/contract discontinuation allegations, which have 
been included in a charge together with nondeferrable 
allegations of statutory impropriety, would be appropriate if 
litigation of the nondeferred allegations necessitated proof of 
facts relevant to a disposition of the allegations otherwise 
susceptible to deferral. There may well be circumstances in 
which the "all or nothing" deferral policy applied in 
Connetquot may be the most appropriate policy choice.13 
12
 30 PERB U3019(1997). 
13
 Id. at 3044. 
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As to alleged violations of §209-a.1(e) of the Act, the Board in SUNY noted that 
jurisdictional deferral of an (e) allegation is never appropriate.14 The Board concluded, 
however, that the deferral of the merits of the alleged §209-a.1(e) violation was 
appropriate under the circumstances of that case, because the §209-a.1(e) allegation 
rested upon the same facts as the §209-a.1(d) unilateral change allegation, which the 
Board decided should be deferred. The Board cautioned, however, that it was not 
holding that a merits deferral of §209-a.1(e) allegations is always appropriate regardless 
of circumstance.15 
Cases raising merits deferral of §§209-a.1(d) and (e) allegations will be reviewed 
on a case by case basis to determine whether we should exercise our discretion and 
defer an alleged §§209-a.1(d) or (e) violation to arbitration. SUNY sets forth our policy 
reasons for a merits deferral of an alleged violation of §209-a.1 (d) of the Act: 
Our merits deferral policy is grounded upon the belief that 
the policies of the Act favoring an accommodation of the 
parties' contractual dispute resolution procedures are 
generally advanced by deferral of the merits of certain 
charges when an interpretation of an expired agreement, 
which is a reasonably arguable source of right to the 
charging party, is necessary to the disposition of the merits 
and an award rendered under a binding grievance arbitration 
procedure is potentially dispositive of the charge.16 
"Allegations of a violation of §209-a.1 (e) of the Act are never subject to jurisdictional 
deferral because a cause of action under §209-a.1(e) of the Act is necessarily based 
upon terms in an agreement which is expired for purposes of the Act." (SUNY, supra, at 
3044). 
15
 in Addison CSD, 17 PERB p 0 7 6 (1984), the Board applied its discretion based upon 
the circumstances in that case, and denied a merits deferral of alleged violations of 
§§209-a.1(a), (c), and (e) of the Act. 
16
 Supra, note 13, at 3043. 
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Fundamentally, our merits deferral policy encourages the parties to develop their own 
means to resolve disputes.17 When appropriate, we will continue to defer an alleged 
violation of §209-a.1(d) premised on a unilateral change consistent with the standards 
set forth in SUNY. 
Se t^io1T2"09:;a71"(e) grantsTPERH exclu^ive^juTisdicTioTrtb^hearimproper practice 
charges alleging an employer's failure to continue all the terms of an expired agreement 
until a new agreement is negotiated. This statutory provision constitutes an express 
exception to the denial, in §205.5(d) of the Act, of PERB's jurisdiction over improper 
practice charges asserting breaches of collectively negotiated agreements. In such 
cases, PERB is required to interpret the terms of the expired agreement. Balancing the 
Act's public policy goal of encouraging negotiated procedures for the resolution of 
disputes with the exclusive jurisdiction granted to the Board under §209-a.1 (e) of the 
Act leads us to conclude that our case by case analysis of whether to defer the merits of 
an §209-a.1(e) allegation continues to be the most appropriate approach. Consistent 
with SUNY, on a case by case basis, when we determine that it is appropriate to defer 
an alleged violation of §209-a.1(d) and the alleged violation of §209-a.1(e) rests upon 
the same facts, we will ordinarily also defer the §209-a.1(e) allegation. 
However, we will retain jurisdiction over the merits of an improper practice charge 
alleging a violation of §209-a.1(e) of the Act at the Board's discretion when the parties 
17
 See NYCTA (Bordansky), 4 PERB fl3031 at 3070 (1971) where the Board held that a 
merits deferral policy allows the "consideration of the merits of certain charges within... 
[PERB's jurisdiction] to be deferred when a contractual grievance has been filed under a 
grievance procedure ending in binding arbitration". 
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have evidenced their mutual preference for PERB to determine the contract issue. This 
can be established by evidence that a charging party has not filed a grievance, or is 
holding in abeyance a filed grievance alleging the same contractual violation as set forth 
in the improper practice charge and where the respondent does not seek deferral. But, it 
will continue to be our general practice to defer alleged violations of §209-a.1(e), on a 
case-by-case basis, to a contractual grievance procedure when an arbitrator's binding 
decision and award is reasonably likely to resolve the contract interpretation issue at the 
center of the dispute. 
In the present case, another factor that renders a merits deferral of the §§209-
a.1(d) and (e) claims by the Board inappropriate is that the parties have fully pursued 
the contract interpretation issues before the ALJ. Deferral would, therefore, impose 
wasteful duplication of efforts on the parties. To the extent that the Board's decision in 
Carmel suggests that the Board on its own motion will issue a merits deferral of §§209-
a.1(d) and (e) allegations following the parties' development of a full record before an ' 
ALJ with respect to the merits, it is hereby overruled. We believe this best effectuates 
the policies of the Act and is in the interest of administrative economy by limiting the 
parties to the forum of their choosing, but only one forum, for the resolution of their 
dispute. 
Substantive Issues 
The ALJ found that the County violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act by unilaterally 
implementing a noncontractual method of recovering leave accruals and holiday pay 
when it deducted leave from Cox's accrued leave and when it instructed her to 
reimburse the County for 32 hours of holiday pay. Cox was instructed to make 
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arrangements for the repayment with Brennan or the Commissioner of Personnel. Citing 
to Levitt v Board of Collective Bargaining of the City of New Yor/c,18 where the Court of 
Appeals held that a policy of collecting employee debts owed to the employer through 
lump sum payments or payroll deductions involved wages and was a mandatory subject 
of negotiations, the ALJ concluded that the County's direction that holiday pay and other 
leave accruals be repaid was the unilateral implementation of such a system that should 
have first been negotiated with the PBA. We find that the ALJ correctly determined that 
the County violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act by acting unilaterally with respect to this 
mandatory subject of negotiations.19 
The ALJ next determined that the County violated §§209-a.1 (d) and (e) of the Act 
by denying Cox leave accruals and holiday pay to which she was entitled under the 
expired collective bargaining agreement. In its exceptions, the County argues that the 
ALJ erred in finding a violation on the grounds that Brennan's determination is entitled 
to substantial deference because, as Insurance Administrator, she is given exclusive 
authority to make initial GML §207-c eligibility determinations and to decide whether to 
accept the hearing officer's subsequent recommendations. The County further argues 
that Brennan "modified" the hearing officer's recommendation by finding that Cox was 
on GML §207-c leave continuously from December 17, 2004 through January 24, 2005 
and that her action was within her authority under the DCPL. 
18
 79 NY2d 120, 25 PERB 1J7514 (1992). 
19
 City of Albany, 23 PERB 1J4531, affd on other grounds, 23 PERB 1(3027(1990), affd, 
24 PERB H7004 (Sup Ct Albany County 1991). Although the Board dismissed the City's 
subsequent exceptions on procedural grounds, it noted that if it had reached the merits 
of the charge, it would have affirmed the ALJ's decision finding that a unilaterally 
implemented recoupment procedure violated the Act. 
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Upon our review, we concur with the ALJ's decision not to grant deference to 
Brennan's interpretation of the agreement as well as with the ALJ's interpretation of the 
expired agreement. 
First, Brennan's opinions with respect to the proper interpretation of the 
agreement were not due any deference by the ALJ.jDuring Brennan's testimony, she 
acknowledged that she did not administer the agreement, was not even familiar with its 
terms and had no actual knowledge of how accruals were credited in the Sheriff's 
department. 
As the ALJ correctly found, the County had agreed to be bound by the hearing 
officer's determination. The hearing officer determined that Cox was entitled to GML 
§207-c benefits for the 16 days that she was absent from work due to a work-related 
injury and ordered her accruals restored for those days. He did not determine that Cox 
was on continuous GML §207-c leave for the entire time covered by her injury. 
Second, the expired collective bargaining agreement clearly states that 
employees on the payroll of the County who are in continuous employment are entitled 
to leave accruals and holiday pay. Cox remained a County employee continuously from 
December 17, 2004 through January 24, 2005 even though she received intermittent 
GML §207-c benefits during that period.20 Neither the agreement nor the DCPL 
prohibits an employee on intermittent GML §207-c leave from continuing to accrue 
contractual leave on days worked or days when not on GML §207-c leave. Therefore, 
20
 City of Schenectady v New York State Public Employment Relations Board, 132 
AD2d 242, 20 PERB 1J7022 (3d Dept 1987), Iv denied, 71 NY2d 803, 21 PERB 1(7007 
(1988), where the court held that a police officer applying for or receiving GML §207-c 
benefits is a public employee of the employer within the meaning of the Act. 
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under the agreement, Cox is contractually entitled to leave accruals and holiday pay 
only if she was continuously employed and not on GML §207-c leave on the dates when 
such leave or holiday pay accrued. 
The collective bargaining agreement provides that employees accrue personal 
leave on January 1, July 1 and September 1 of each year, vacation leave on a monthly 
basis, and sick leave for each month of continuous service. Holiday pay is due 
employees on each of several specified holidays, as here relevant: Christmas Eve, 
Christmas Day, New Year's Eve, New Year's Day and Martin Luther King, Jr. Day. 
The ALJ correctly found, consistent with the hearing officer's decision, that Cox 
was not on GML §207-c leave on January 1, 2005, her regularly scheduled day off. 
Therefore, Cox was entitled to accrue three days of personal leave on January 1, 2005, 
consistent with the express terms of the expired agreement. 
Likewise, the ALJ was correct in finding that Cox was entitled to holiday pay 
under the expired agreement for Christmas Day (December 25, 2004), New Year's Day 
(January 1, 2005) and Martin Luther King, Jr. Day (January 19, 2005) because the 
County's hearing officer had concluded that Cox was not on GML §207-c leave on those 
days. Similarly, the ALJ correctly found that Cox was not entitled to holiday pay for 
December 24 and December 31, 2004, because the County's hearing officer had 
concluded that Cox was on §207-c leave for those days. Therefore, we affirm the ALJ's 
determination that the County violated the Act when it wrongfully sought reimbursement 
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for 24 hours of holiday pay for contractual holidays when Cox was not on GML §207-c 
leave.21 
With respect to the accrual of vacation and sick leave in December 2004, the 
agreement allows employees to accrue vacation time monthly in 6.67 hour increments, 
if they have been employed for more than one month but less than three years, and to 
accrue sick leave at the rate of one day for each month of continuous service. The ALJ 
correctly rejected the County's argument that Cox was not entitled to accrue vacation 
and sick leave in December 2004 because she was on GML §207-c leave at the end of 
the month. In light of Brennan's speculative testimony, we affirm the ALJ's finding that 
the agreement does not provide for vacation and sick leave accruals to be credited at 
the end of each month. Therefore, we find that the County violated the Act when it failed 
to continue the mandatory terms of the expired agreement.22 
Lastly, the County argues that the PBA waived its right to file an improper 
practice charge because the DCPL limits challenges to determinations made thereunder 
While we have found that Cox was only entitled to 24 hours of holiday pay based 
upon our determination that she was not eligible for 4 hours of holiday pay on 
December 24 and on December 31, 2004, we have ordered the County to reimburse 
her for the entire 32 hours of holiday pay that was improperly recouped from her, 
pursuant to Brennan's March 17, 2006 letter. Once the County and the PBA have 
negotiated a recoupment procedure, the County may recoup the 8 hours of holiday pay 
for December 24 and 31, 2004 pursuant to that negotiated procedure. 
22
 In affirming, we note that the County did not file an exception challenging the ALJ's 
conclusion that it had violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act by refusing to continue the 
mandatoriiy negotiated terms of the expired agreement. Therefore, it is waived. Supra, 
note 1. However, we further note that, under the Act, PERB has jurisdiction to hear an 
improper practice charge challenging the failure of an employer to continue the terms of 
an expired collectively negotiated agreement under §209-a. 1(e), but not §209-a;1(d) of 
the Act. 
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' to court review pursuant to CPLR Article 78. As the County did not raise waiver as an 
affirmative defense in its answer and raises it for the first time in its exceptions, the 
Board will not address it.23 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the County's exceptions and affirm the decision 
of the ALJ, finding that the County violated §§209-a.1 (d) and (e) of the Act when it 
unilaterally deducted personal, vacation and sick leave from Cox's accruals and 
required reimbursement to the County of 32 hours of holiday pay. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County forthwith: 
1. Cease and desist deducting any wages and leave benefits 
from Deputy Sheriff Amanda Cox pursuant to its March 17, 
2006 letter, and return to her all wages and leave benefits 
that it has already deducted pursuant to said letter, including 
8 hours of holiday pay found herein to be owed to the 
County, until it satisfies its bargaining obligations concerning 
a system to recoup overpayments to unit employees, plus 
interest at the maximum legal rate on any holiday pay that 
Cox reimbursed the County up to 24 hours. 
2. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations customarily 
used to post notices to unit employees. 
DATED: April 3, 2008 
Albany, New York 
.. .. -1/-- - -
7
 Ro6ert S. tfite, Member 
23
 NYCTA, 20 PERB 3037 (1987), confd, NYCTA v PERB 147 AD2d 574, 22 PERB 
117001 (2d Dept 1989), motion to amend granted, 156 AD2d 689, 23 PERB 1J7002 (2d 
Dept 1989). 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Sullivan in the unit represented 
A by the Sullivan County Patrolman's Benevolent Association, Inc., that the County: 
1. Will discontinue deducting any wages and leave benefits 
from Deputy Sheriff Amanda Cox pursuant to its March 17, 
2006 letter, and return to her all wages and leave benefits 
that it has already deducted pursuant to said letter, including 
8 hours of holiday pay found herein to be owed to the 
County, until it satisfies its bargaining obligations concerning 
a system to recoup overpayments to unit employees, plus 
interest at the maximum legal rate on any holiday pay that 
Cox reimbursed the County up to 24 hours. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOCES UNITED SUPPORT STAFF, 
Petiti one r-, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5774 
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL 
SERVICES FIRST SUPERVISORY DISTRICT 
OF MONROE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the BOCES United Support Staff, has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
/ 
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Included: Full and part-time employees in the following titles: Bus Driver, Bus 
Attendant, Bus Mechanic, Cleaner, Custodial Assistant, 
Maintenance Mechanic I, Maintenance Mechanic II, Maintenance 
Mechanic III, School Sentry I, School Sentry II, Food Service 
Helper, Cook Manager and Head Groundskeeper. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the BOCES United Support Staff. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 3, 2008 
Albany, New York 
/CnvittA-' 
Jerome Lefkawitz, C lwman 
V L. 7T-Robert S. Hite, Member 
